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THESIS ABSTRACT
NAME: Ayed Saad Al-Qahtani
TITLE OF STUDY: Fault Tolerance Techniques for Sequential Circuits: a De-
sign Level Approach
MAJOR FIELD: Computer Engineering
DATE OF DEGREE: June 2010
With technology advancement (90 nm, 65 nm, 35 nm and even smaller), systems
became more subjected to higher manufacturing defects and higher susceptibility
to soft errors due to the exponential decrease in device feature size. Currently,
soft errors induced by ion particles are no longer limited to specific field such as
aerospace applications. This raises the challenge to come up with techniques to
tackle transient or soft faults effects in both combinational and sequential circuits
in general. This work is directed to analyze, model and design sequential circuits
at the design level, namely finite state machine (FSM), to increase its tolerance to
radiation induced transient faults. A technique based on adding redundant equiv-
alent states to protect few states with high probability of occurrence is proposed.
The added states guarantee that all single bit faults occurring in the state vari-
xv
ables or in their combinational logic of highly occurring states are tolerated. The
proposed technique has minimal area overhead because only few number of states
are chosen for protection. In addition, state assignment is explored and found to
have a minimal impact on soft error tolerance of sequential circuits. Hence, an-
other technique is proposed to enhance reliability to a sequential circuit that has a
specific state assignment optimizing a certain criteria such as area. Experimental
results on ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits show that failure rate reduction
of 62% up to 83% is achieved compared to the original circuits. The number of
highly probable protected states is 9% up to 40% of the total number of states
that yield 25% up to 90% state probability coverage. The area cost is found to
be about 1.80 up to 4 times the original circuits area. Moreover, starting from
a state assignment which optimizes a sequential circuit in terms of area, similar
failure rate reduction is achieved and the resulting area overhead is kept minimal.
Keywords: fault tolerance, soft errors, transient faults, single event upset (SEU),
single event transients (SET), nano technology, robust system design, circuit reli-
ability, sequential circuits, soft error rate, triple modular redundancy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND
MOTIVATION
Vulnerability of digital systems grows in direct proportion to the Moores
law [1]. Continuous improvements in CMOS technology entering the nanometer
scale has resulted into quantum mechanical effects creating many technological
challenges for further scaling of CMOS devices. This has led to the exploration of
new technologies for circuit design. Nanotechnology-based fabrication is expected
to offer the extra density and potential performance to take electronic circuits the
next step. It is estimated that molecular electronics can achieve very high densi-
ties (1012 devices per cm2) and operate at very high frequencies (of the order of
THz) [2]. Several successful nano-scale electronic devices have been demonstrated
by researchers, some of the most promising being carbon nano-tubes (CNT) [3],
silicon nano-wires (NW) [4, 5], and quantum dot cells [6]. Nano-scale devices are
limited by higher defect rates and increased susceptibility to soft errors. This is
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due to the inherent imprecision and randomness in the bottom-up manufacturing
process which results in a large number of defective devices during the fabrication
process. In addition, the reduced noise tolerance of these devices is responsible
for inducing device malfunctions by external influences like EMI, thermal pertur-
bations and cosmic radiations. Therefore, permanent defects may emerge during
manufacturing process and transient errors can happen during the operation ren-
dering nano-electronic connections, wires and devices effectively unusable.
Defects or Faults can be classified as either permanent faults or transient faults.
The Reliability of a circuit is affected by the amount of both types of faults a circuit
can not tolerate. It can be defined as immunity to failures which makes the circuit
functions properly despite the existence of those faults. Handling permanent hard
faults is much easier than transient soft errors since permanent errors always reside
in the circuit the whole time whether the circuit is combinational or sequential.
Immunity from transient faults is very crucial especially in sequential circuits since
a single fault at a short amount of time can affect the current machine state and
can cause the system to end up working in the wrong trace of states.
In order to address issues of unreliability in nano-electronics and to ensure
reliable system design and operation, defect tolerant design techniques need to
be devised and applied for emerging nano-electronic devices. Enhancing the fault
tolerance of circuits against permanent and transient types of faults is required
to enhance circuit reliability. In this thesis, we address the fault tolerance of
transient faults, known as soft errors. In the following sections, we will introduce
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sequential circuit model as well as the nature of transient faults. After that, a
glance will be given about this work motivations, objectives and contributions.
Then we will finish by thesis organization.
1.1 Sequential Circuits and Finite State Ma-
chine
Combinational logic and storage elements, namely flip-flops, are interconnected
to form sequential circuits. In other words, sequential circuits are basically circuits
which memorize their state. The sequential circuit receives binary information as
inputs; together with present state stored by the flip-flops determines the binary
value of the next state. There are two types of sequential circuits and their
classification depends on the times at which their inputs are observed and their
internal state changes. The behavior of synchronous sequential circuits can be
defined from the knowledge of its signals at discrete instants of times controlled
by clock signal. On the other hand, asynchronous sequential circuit depends
upon the inputs at any instance of time. In this thesis, we are only interested in
synchronous sequential circuits. So it is expected that sequential circuits in the
following context meant to be synchronous and controlled by a clock. Sequential
circuits in which the output depends on the inputs as well as the current states are
called Mealy model circuits. Otherwise, if the outputs depend only on the current
states then they are called Moore model circuits. Both of their behavior can be
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Figure 1.1: Sequential circuit block diagram.
Figure 1.2: A bit flipper.
represented using state table or finite state machine (FSM). The general block
diagram for a sequential circuit is shown in Figure 1.1. In Figure 1.1, the output
is based on current states and external inputs (mealy machine). In Figure 1.2 we
show a bit flipper example. Bit flipper FSM is composed of 2 states, S1 (output
=1) and S0 (output = 0). At any specific time the machine is in either S1 or S0,
according to the applied input, X. Thus, we need only one flip flop namely F1 to
manufacture this simple system. The block diagram for the corresponding FSM
is also shown in Figure 1.2. [7–9].
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1.2 Soft Errors in Nano-scale Sequential Cir-
cuits
Temporal transient faults (soft errors) can hit either in the combinational logic
or flip flops of a sequential circuit block diagram as it is depicted in Figure 1.1.
If it happens in the combinational logic, it will result in Single Event Transient
(SET). On the other hand, if it happens in the memory cell itself, it will result in
a Single Event Upset (SEU). Both of SET and SEU cause a major implication in
sequential circuit and should receive a proper treatment.
Transient faults (SET / SEU) mainly are caused by ions movement through
the materials of ICs. To illustrate how transient soft errors can change the state
of a transistor from OFF to ON or vice versa, we assume the NMOS transistor
shown in Figure 1.3 (a) ON. The voltage applied at the gate attracts electrons
in the (p-) area, in the same way the holes are attracted by the (p+) substrate.
Thus, a channel is generated with a certain amount of carrier electrons that can
conduct the two highly doped (n+) regions given that enough voltage is applied
to the drain. In normal operation, a current will flow from the drain to the source
that make the transistor ON. Suppose an energized ion strike through the drain
of NMOS transistor as it is shown in Figure 1.3 (a). It loses energy due to the
interaction with the bounded electrons, causing an ionization of the material it
passes through and forming a certain track. Electron-hole pairs are produced
along the track of the ion proportional to the ion energy and the length of its
track. If there is no voltage applied to the drain the electrons and holes will
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recombine. On the other hand, sine the transistor is ON, the voltage applied to
the drain separates the electrons and holes. Hence, the electrons are collected
by the drain and the holes are collected by the (p+) substrate and a prompt
component of current at the drain is observed in the shape of negative pulse as it
is shown in Figure 1.3 (b). If the resulting charge of this prompt current is high
enough, it will lead to discharging the voltage at the drain for a very short period
of time on the order of 100 to 200 picoseconds and will make the transistor OFF
at that period of time.
To carry on illustration, suppose that (n2) in the memory cell shown in Fig-
ure 1.4 is hit by ion particle. Given that the amount of charge resulting from the
induced current by the particle is high enough to switch (n2) from OFF to ON,
the memory cell operation will toggle (n1), (p1) and (p2) to OFF, ON and OFF,
respectively. Eventually, the bit value stored in the memory cell will change to its
opposite value [10,11].
In the previous generation of CMOS technologies, such a short lived current
is not considered in the calculations related to CMOS devices because the sizes of
the CMOS transistors is considered respectively large and the resulting prompted
current is no more than a small, not apparent, attenuation and usually neglected.
With the feature sizes reaching below 0.35 microns, SET and SEU faults are no
longer considered a small attenuation. Instead they will be considered normal cir-
cuit signals. Moreover, multi ion noise might affect more than one drain of CMOS
devices due to nuclear reaction properties of the materials used to manufacture
6
Figure 1.3: NMOS transistor hit by ion particle.
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Figure 1.4: Memory cell.
CMOS devices [12]. This will cause serious, if not grave implications for circuits,
especially sequential circuits.
In order to give insight about how dangerous this phenomena is, suppose that a
sequential circuit is built using nanotechnology using 0.35 micron or even smaller.
Assume that the FSM of the circuit require 3 flip flops. Suppose one of the states
= (000) gives a read control signal and another state = (001) gives the write
signal to the RAM. If a transient fault existed in the circuit specifically in the
first flip flop when it was in state = (000), this produces a write command to
the RAM instead of a read command. This will cause unwanted overwrite in an
inappropriate time which might lead to unexpected behavior of the system.
Fortunately, there are some masking properties that prevent transient faults
from affecting sequential circuits, namely: logical masking, electrical masking and
latching window masking. Logical masking prevents the SET from propagating
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from the fault location to the Flip Flop (FF) by the logic of the circuit. For
example, a 2-input AND gate can mask any fault in one input if the other input is
grounded. Electrical masking attenuates or completely masks the SET signal due
to electrical properties of gates. Latching window masking prevents SET form
being captured because it violates the setup and hold conditions of the memory
element. Thus the fault won’t be latched.
However, the reduction in feature sizes limits the effect of those masking. Also,
increasing the clock rates causes the setup and hold times to get shrinked which
will limit the latch window masking effect as well.
In order to estimate how effective a circuit can be toward soft errors, soft er-
ror rate (SER) estimation researches have been proposed. They fall into three
categories: circuit level, which computes the probability of a SEU producing an
error on the output of a gate hit by ion particle. These techniques use SPICE
simulation to obtain these probabilities. Gate-level SER estimation techniques
try to compute the SER rate of a circuit node by computing the SEU occurrence
rate, the error propagation probability (EPP), and the error latching probability.
To compute the error susceptibility of a node to SEUs, it is required to compute
the probability that the node is functionally sensitized by the input vectors to
propagate the erroneous value from the error site to system outputs. Architec-
tural level SER estimation is based on electrical and latching-window masking,
which provides combinational logic with a form of natural protection against soft
errors. Usually Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF), which expresses the
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probability that a fault in that particular structure will result in an error, is used
in architectural level SER estimation.
1.3 Research Motivation
With technology advancement (90 nm, 65 nm, 35 nm and even smaller), sys-
tems became more subjected to higher susceptibility to soft errors due to the
exponential decrease in device feature size. Therefore, soft errors induced by ion
particles are no longer limited to specific field such as aerospace applications and
can no longer be neglected. This raises the challenge to come up with techniques
to tackle transient or soft faults effects not only in space application but in both
combinational and sequential circuits in general. Many researchers have studied
the reliability of circuits using some techniques such as circuit level hardening,
hardware redundancy and time redundancy. Their main concern is how to avoid
the effect of SET and/or SEU. Most of the techniques target the implementation
level of a circuit and offer area or time overhead for enhancing reliability. Since
steady state probability for several sequential benchmark circuits vary, our method
takes advantage of that and chooses some of the states with high probability of
occurrence for protection using redundant states. This way the area overhead is
kept minimal.
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1.4 Problem Statement and Thesis Objectives
Problem statement is specified as well as the thesis main contributions in the
following sub-sections.
1.4.1 Problem Statement
The general problem statement is: Given a sequential circuit, we would like to
increase its reliability against transient errors with minimum area overhead and
operation cycle time.
1.4.2 Thesis Objectives
The objective of this work is to investigate the design of soft error tolerant
sequential circuits based on adding redundant states at the state diagram level.
The objective of adding redundant states is to guarantee tolerance of all single
soft errors of states with high probability of occurrence. The minimum number
of redundant states will be added to minimize the hardware overhead. State
assignment for enhancing soft error reliability will also be investigated. The main
project objectives can be summarized as:
 Design of a soft error tolerant technique for sequential circuits at the state
diagram level or design level.
 Investigate the impact of state assignment on soft error tolerance and de-
velop and implement a heuristic for enhancing soft error tolerance of sequen-
tial circuits.
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1.5 Thesis Contributions
To achieve the thesis objectives, the contributions of this thesis can be sum-
marized as follows:
 Implement a tool for computing state probabilities for a finite state machine.
 Implement a tool for computing soft error reliability for sequential circuits
based on Monte Carlo simulation [13]. The objective of this tool is to find the
failure rate of a sequential circuit as more faults are observed in the circuit.
The monte carlo based simulation tool will be developed using Perl [14–16]
in Linux [17–20] system to assess the soft error reliability of the resulting
synthesized circuits. (SIS) tool [21] will be used for synthesis and (hope)
tool [22] will be used for simulation purposes.
 Develop and implement an algorithm to enhance reliability of sequential
circuits based on adding redundant states at the state diagram level to
ensure single fault tolerance. The development of the algorithm is done
by modifying the finite state machine of a sequential circuit by adding the
minimum necessary equivalent redundant states to selected states for which
soft error tolerance is desired. Also, the minimum number of bits used in
state encoding that ensure fault tolerance of single faults will be computed.
It is done using C# [23].
 Evaluate the proposed soft error tolerant design algorithm in terms of circuit
reliability and other parameters including area and delay and compare with
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existing techniques. A tool will be developed for assigning codes to states
according to certain developed heuristics. (SIS) tool will be used in the
synthesis process and the developed monte carol based simulation tool will
be used to assess soft error tolerance of synthesized circuits.
 Investigate the impact of state assignment on sequential circuits reliability.
 Develop and implement an algorithm for state assignment to enhance soft
error tolerance on top of an area optimized design.
 Evaluate the proposed state assignment for soft error tolerance in terms of
soft error reliability and other parameters including area.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The thesis is organized into the following chapters. Chapter 2 starts with a
background about the current fault tolerance methods. An exploration of dif-
ferent approaches to solve this problem at different levels of abstraction will be
presented including triple modular redundancy (TMR), hardening techniques, er-
ror correction using checkers, selective protection after measuring the soft error
effect using probabilistic methods, and some specialized techniques. In addition,
a classification of those current techniques will be shown based on the level of
abstract that they are targeting.
Chapter 3 proposes a method, namely Algorithm 1, that enhances the fault
tolerance of sequential circuit using state redundancy. This chapter starts with
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defining state types that are going to be used through out the rest of the thesis.
Then, state probability calculation is going to be studied specifically for bench-
mark circuits to identify the most probable states in each of them. States with
the most probability of occurrence are chosen to build the proposed solution. Se-
quential circuit model in presence of redundant states, the mechanisms of how
the solution works, and how it is implemented, are described. Furthermore, we
will look into how to calculate the minimum number of bits used in the proposed
method, its complexity, and the correlation between state probability and failure
rate for a chosen circuit. After that, a comparison between this solution and other
well known techniques is introduced in terms of approaching the problem and en-
hancing fault tolerance. The finishing point of this chapter is reached by giving a
conclusion that summarizes the framework of the proposed algorithm.
A novel idea, Algorithm 2, to enhancing reliability to area optimized sequential
circuits is discussed in chapter 4. First, the impact of state assignment on sequen-
tial circuit reliability is going to be discussed. Second, we will visit how optimizing
the area of a sequential circuit is done without taking into account increasing the
fault tolerance against soft faults. Third, we will add soft error protection by
introducing redundancy to area optimized sequential circuits. The mechanism of
the algorithm as well as its complexity are further discussed. Conclusion is given
at the end of this chapter to summarize ideas presented in Algorithm 2.
In order to simulate and evaluate the ideas and algorithms which are proposed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, Chapter 5 describes the simulation framework and
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the method used to evaluate circuit failure probability and reliability as well as the
assumptions made in the simulation, tools used to perform it, and fault injection
mechanism that is used as a part of the simulation.
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the proposed algorithms as well as a com-
parison between them and the current methods regarding fault tolerance. They
are done in terms of failure rate, area, and limitations. It also presents many
examples of implementing the solution on several sequential circuits benchmarks
of ISCAS89 presented as FSM or state table.
The thesis finally concludes in Chapter 7, where the proposed solutions are
summarized, with a list of potential improvements and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, definitions regarding fault tolerance are reviewed. After that,
a survey of the current methods to tolerate SEU/SET in sequential circuits are
discussed including triple modular redundancy (TMR), hardening techniques, Er-
ror correction using checkers, probabilistic methods to estimate soft errors effect,
and some techniques specialized for certain applications. Finally, a classification
of the known methods to tackle soft error effect to sequential circuit is explored.
2.1 Definitions
Many terms are used to describe when electronic systems fail. In the next few
subsections, the definitions of some terms used through out the thesis are defined.
2.1.1 Defects, Faults and Errors
The definitions of defects, errors and faults terms as defined in [24] are pre-
sented.
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Defects
A defect in the electronic system is the unintended difference between the
implemented hardware and its intended design. Some typical defects in VLSI
chips are:
 Process Defects - missing contact windows, parasitic transistors, oxide break-
down.
 Material Defects - bulk defects (cracks, crystal imperfections), surface im-
purities.
 Age Defects - dielectric breakdown, elctro-migration etc.
 Package Defects - contact degradation, seal leaks.
Defects occur either during manufacturing or during the use of devices. Repeated
occurrence of the same defect indicates the need for improvement in the manu-
facturing process or the design of the device.
Faults
A representation of a ”defect” at the abstracted function level is called a
fault. The difference between a defect and a fault is rather subtle. They are the
imperfections in the hardware and function respectively.
Errors
A wrong output signal produced by a defective system (or circuit) is called an
error. An error is an effect whose cause is some ”defect”. Fabrication defects, fab-
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rication errors and physical failures are collectively termed as physical faults [24].
According to their stability in time, physical faults can be classified as:
 Permanent faults: They are those which are always present after their oc-
currence.
 Intermittent faults: They are those which exist only during some intervals.
 Transient faults: They are one-time occurrence (also known as Single Event
Upsets (SEUs) or Single-Event Transients (SETs)) which are caused by a
temporary change in some environment factor e.g., due to α-particle radia-
tion etc.
2.1.2 Defect (or Fault) Models
While analyzing the defect tolerance of a circuit, the effect of defects in the
circuit needs to be simulated. The effect of a production defect can be complex.
Accurate defect modeling based on layout and geometrical considerations is nor-
mally not an option when the effect of production defects is to be analyzed. For
this reason, several defect(or fault) models have been proposed at different levels
of abstraction. There are many fault models presented in the literature such as
stuck-at defect (or fault) model, stuck-open and stuck-short defect (or fault) model,
bridging defect (or fault) model and crosspoint defect(or fault) model. In our work,
we assume that a single stuck-at fault is used. Therefore, we will explain it in
this context. For other defect (or fault) models, the interested reader may refer
to [24].
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Stuck-at defect (or fault) model is based on assigning a fixed (0 or 1) value to
a signal line in the circuit. A signal line is an input or an output of a logic gate or
a flip-flop. The most popular forms are the single stuck-at faults which are also
known as stuck-at-1 and stuck-at-0 faults.
However, in the simulation part of our work, in order to reflect a temporal
fault, an emulation to the stuck-at fault for only 1 cycle time is injected in the
faulty circuit.
2.1.3 Failure Rate
Failure rate represents the frequency with which a component of the circuit
fails. The failure rate of a circuit usually depends on time, with the rate varying
over the life cycle of the circuit. The failure rate can be defined as: the total
number of failures within an item population, divided by the total time expended
by that population, during a particular measurement interval under stated con-
ditions [25, 26]. In our case the failure rate is redefined as: the total number of
failed experiments divided by the total number of performed experiments.
Particularly in semiconductor industry, circuits failure rates can be expressed
as failures per billion. The Failures In Time (FIT) rate of a device is the number
of failures that can be expected in one billion (109) device-hours of operation.
That means 1000 devices for 1 million hours, or 1 million devices for 1000 hours
each, or some other combination [27–29]. One calculation made by a nice white
paper with many references concludes that 1000 to 5000 FIT per Mbit (0.21 error
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per day per Gbyte) is a typical DRAM soft error failure rate [30].
2.1.4 Reliability
The reliability of a system can be defined as the ability to perform the specified
function under stated conditions [31]. For hardware systems, the most common
way of evaluating reliability is to apply a probabilistic reliability function R(t)
that gives the probability that a system is working correctly between time 0 and
time t, given certain conditions and correct behavior at time 0. If the failure rate
of the system is constant over time, the reliability function is R(t) = eλ t where λ
is the constant failure rate for one unit of time. When λ t is small, R(t) ≈ 1−λ t.
A defect-tolerant system can continue to operate despite a certain number of
defects. For such systems, where not all subcomponents need to be working, more
elaborate reliability calculations need to be performed. In order to achieve that,
Monte Carlo simulations need to be employed [13].
An alternative evaluation criterion is Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) which is
the average time a system will run before failing. MTTF is linked to the failure
rate in the following way: MTTF = (1/λ) . If λ is the failure rate per hour,
MTTF is the average number of hours before failing. When considering how
reliable a system is in the presence of production defects, time is not relevant.
MTTF is therefore not applicable and reliability is simply R = (1− λ) where λ is
the probability of failing under stated conditions [26].
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2.1.5 Fault Tolerance
The term fault-tolerance first appeared in technical literature in 1967, defined
as: A system is fault-tolerant if its programs can be properly executed despite the
occurrence of logic faults [32]. The prime motivation at that time was challenges
in interplanetary exploration. The objective of fault-tolerance is either to mask,
or to recover from, faults once they have been detected [33]. It is in contrast to
the second method of achieving system reliability, fault prevention, which seeks
to eliminate all faults before the system is put to use. Complete fault prevention
is impossible to achieve in practice and high degrees of prevention is costly [34].
Fault-tolerance is therefore commonly used in increasing system reliability, often
in combination with partial fault prevention. Much research on reliable systems is
concerned with the detection of faults using error detecting and correcting codes
or fault-detecting and self-repairing circuits. The tolerance itself is achieved using
redundancy techniques. Those techniques are going to be discussed in the next
section.
2.2 Current Fault Tolerance Methods
In order to overcome the soft errors effect problem in sequential circuits, several
techniques have been introduced. Some of these techniques are based on tolerating
errors in combinational circuits while other techniques are focused on tolerating
errors occurring at memory elements. Most of these techniques are applied at the
gate/ implementation level of a circuit. Also there are several error correcting
21
mechanisms using checkers presented in this field. Moreover, temporal faults are
estimated and modeled using probabilistic methods.
2.2.1 Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) is one of the famous techniques to reduce
the impact of hard/soft errors in combinational logic. It is one of the generalized
NMR system. An NMR system (also known as M-of-N system) is a system that
consists of N modules and needs at least M of them for proper operation. TMR is
a system where M = 2 and N = 3, which consists of three identical modules whose
outputs are voted on. If 2 modules out of 3 produce expected correct results, this
implies that the majority of the modules produce correct results, and hence the
system will be functional. In TMR, all the three identical modules perform the
same operation, and a voter accepts outputs from all three modules, producing a
majority vote at its output as shown in Figure 2.1 [35].
In such a structure, M = 2 and N = 3 and a voter selects the majority vote. If a
single voter is used, that voter becomes a critical point of failure and the reliability
of the TMR structure is limited by that of the final arbitration unit (i.e.,voter),
making the approach difficult in the context of highly integrated nano-systems [36].
Despite this limitation, TMR is heavily used in practice whenever the reliability
of the circuit is a crucial demand especially when single faults are needed to be
protected.
In sequential circuits, TMR voting idea is implemented in similar way. In [10,
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Figure 2.1: A Triple Modular Redundant (TMR) structure.
11] a TMR hardening technique addressing SEU faults is proposed based on a
temporally redundant sampling latch shown in Figure 2.2. The temporal latch
approach provides immunity to soft errors. The latch is replicated three times to
generate samples of output in different clock cycles and then a majority voting
mechanism is used to prevent soft errors from propagating. It is suggested that
every flip flop be replaced by this temporal latch.
The proposed temporal sampling latch is shown in Figure 2.2. The circuit con-
tains nine level sensitive latches (U1 through U9), one majority gate (U10), and
three inverters. Two level sensitive latches in tandem and clocked by complemen-
tary clock signals (such as U1 followed by U2) form an edge triggered D-Flip-Flop.
With the clock inversions used in Figure 2.2, the D-Flip-Flops formed by (U1, U2),
(U3, U4), and (U5, U6) are triggered on the falling edges of the clocks CLKA,
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Figure 2.2: Temporal sampling latch with sample and release stages.
CLKB, and CLKC, respectively. The three D-Flip-Flops (U1, U2), (U3, U4), and
(U5, U6) operate in parallel and form the temporal sampling stage of the circuit.
Each of these three D-Flip-Flops drives another level sensitive latch. These latches
(U7, U8, and U9) together with a simple majority gate (U10) form the sample
release stage of the circuit.
The combinatorial logic is effectively replicated, not in space but in time.
The same logic is really just used at three different times. The result of this
is that errors are flushed on each clock cycle and the maximum error latency
never exceeds a clock period. Temporal redundancy of the circuit is achieved
by combining a temporal sampling stage with a sample release stage where the
sampling is controlled by three clocks (CLKA, CLKB, and CLKC) and the release
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Figure 2.3: Temporal latch control clocks derived from master clock.
is invoked by CLKD. The clocking scheme is therefore central to the operation of
circuit.
The clocking scheme is shown in Figure 2.3. The figure shows two cycles of the
master clock and two cycles of the temporal sampling latch control clocks. The
master clock (top curve) would generally be the clock signal brought onto the
chip through an input pad. The bottom four curves show the four clock signals
(CLKA, CLKB, CLKC, and CLKD) used above in Figure 2.2. The CLKB and
CLKC widths need only be greater than the maximum width of any SET induced
in the combinatorial logic.
The operation of the circuit of Figure 2.2 with the clocking sequence of Fig-
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ure 2.3 is most easily explained if we start at the beginning of a computational
cycle which begins at the rising edge of CLKD. At this time the sample release
latches (U7, U8, U9) pass their input data to the majority gate (U10) where it
subsequently appears at the output node (OUT). CLKD subsequently goes low,
the release latches (U7, U8, U9) enter a hold state, and this original data remains
asserted on the output for the remainder of the computational cycle.
This output data is then processed by intervening combinatorial logic before it
appears at the input to the next temporal sampling latch. The data must arrive
at the input to the next stage before the falling edge of CLKA at which time the
data is stored in the a D-Flip-Flop formed by latches U1 and U2. CLKB then goes
high to sample the input. Whatever data is at the input when CLKB goes back
low is then stored in the D-Flip-Flop formed by latches U3 and U4. Finally, CLKC
toggles high and low to sample and hold the input data in the final D-Flip-Flop
formed by latches U5 and U6. At this time another computational cycle begins.
The input data to each temporal sampling latch has been asserted on the three
inputs to the sample release stage. When this next computational cycle begins,
CLKD again goes high and the data appears at the output of the majority gate.
Data is released to the combinatorial logic on each rising edge of CLKD and must
reach the next sampling latch before the falling edge of CLKA (minus the setup
time). From Figure 2.3, this is thus the period of the master clock minus the
D-Flip-Flop setup time and minus the sum of the CLKB and CLKC durations.
An equivalent way of viewing the incurred speed penalty is that the temporal
26
latch setup time is effectively increased by the sum of the widths of the CLKB
and CLKC phases.
As it is shown in Figure 2.2, the Majority gate again (i.e. voter) causes the
same limitation which is that it can not protect against soft errors happening in
it.
In [37], the same idea is presented. A systematic error masking technique
based on using latch majority voting to tackle soft errors in combinational and
sequential circuits is discussed. It is based on studying the latching windows and
introducing a method that uses temporal redundancy. It prevents a SET pulse of
width less than approximately half of the slack available in the propagation path
from latching and turning into a soft error.
2.2.2 Latch Hardening Techniques
Although TMR for sequential circuits described in the previous section is basi-
cally one type of latch hardening, this section is exploring different methods that
involve a change in the latch design to achieve soft error tolerance.
In [38], the authors review several designs and compare them based on their
robustness and their power and performance overheads. They also propose new
latch designs, the best of which is vulnerable only to a single-event, multiple-upset
without any delay overhead and consumes only 40% power of a standard latch.
This new latch can be applied as input to a sampling circuit which drives a voting
circuit to get a tolerated output.
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The reviewed latch designs are: single event upset (SEU) tolerant latch de-
picted in Figure 2.4, soft-error hardened latch depicted in Figure 2.5 and dual
interlocked storage cell(DICE) depicted in Figure 2.6. In addition, the authors
in [38] proposed latch is depicted in Figure 2.7.
The schematic of the latch proposed in [39], is shown in Figure 2.4. The latch
stores data D at PP and NN while complement of data (D) is stored at QP and
QN. PP and QP are driven only by PMOS transistors while NN and QN are
driven only by NMOS transistors. This latch utilizes the fact that only a 0 to 1
flip can occur in a PMOS and only a 1 to 0 flip can occur in an NMOS, due to
which nodes QP and QN are soft-error hardened. Particle strikes at any of the
two nodes PP or NN do not change the output Q, however they cause node Q to
become dynamic for a short period of time. To see more details for this latch and
the operation of other latches, the reader can find more information in [39], [40],
[41, 42] and [38], respectively.
The latch shown in Figure 2.4 can be used to prevent soft errors due to particle
strikes in combinational logic. This requires inputs DP and DN to be fed from two
different Combinational Logic Block (CLB)s or delayed by certain time interval.
The delay of this latch was found to be 5 times of the original latch due to the
high CK-Q delay. The latch can be assumed to be Single Event Multiple Upset
(SEMU) hardened for most commodity applications. This latch consumes static
power due to some of the PMOS and NMOS transistors not completely turning
off. The power consumed by the latch is found to be 1.52 times of the original
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Figure 2.4: Single-event-upset-tolerant latch.
latch. Clearly the number of transistors used in this design is 12.
The latch shown in Figure 2.5 can only handle SEU on the latch itself. Any
transient pulse with width equal to the latching window of the modified latch can
cause soft error if it is not logically or latching window masked. However, soft
errors can be caused due to SEMUs on the latch. The delay overhead of this latch
was reported to be 5-20% of the original latch. The power consumed by the latch
was reported to be just 2-3% of the original latch. The number of transistors used
in this design is 18.
The latch shown in Figure 2.6 does not mask transient pulses originating in
CLB. This latch is also highly vulnerable to SEMUs as compared to other latches
analyzed before. The delay of this latch was reported to be similar or just 2-3%
higher than the original latch. The power consumed by the latch was reported to
be just 34% of the original latch. The number of transistors used in this design is
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Figure 2.5: Soft-error hardened latch.
Figure 2.6: Dual interlocked storage cell(DICE).
30
Figure 2.7: (a) Latch A having best power, performance and soft-error immu-
nity among the proposed latches. (b) Latch B can be used to provide soft-error
protection for CLBs also.
18.
Advanced and robust designs latches are depicted in Figure 2.7. The latch in
Figure 2.7(a) doesn’t have SEMU immunity in most of the cases. However, the
delay is almost the same as the original latch and the power consumption is only
40% compared to original latch. An alternative design shown in Figure 2.7(b)
gives better immunity to SEMU and provides soft-error protection for transient
faults in CLB. Moreover, the delay is almost twice as the original latch and the
power consumption is only 30% compared to original latch.
In [28], it is concluded that 49% of the overall SER for a design manufactured
using state of the art technologies results from sequential elements. They also
propose scan reuse method in which they reuse the scan portion in scan cell
design to reduce the impact of soft errors by trapping the error inside the scan
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path and then shifting out within a specific number of cycles. This technique
involves adding a small amount of gates to the scan cell design . However, it uses
operation cycles to recover the circuit operation.
To look at it in details, Figure 2.8 shows a microprocessor scan flip-flop design
that comprises two distinct circuits: a system flip-flop and a scan portion. All
scan flip-flops in a design are connected together as one or more shift registers.
The SI input of a scan flip-flop is connected to the SO output of the preceding
scan flipflop in the shift register. The structure of the scan portion of Figure 2.8
is similar to the system flip-flop, with the addition of interface circuits to move
data between the system flip-flop and the scan portion, as well as shifting the
test pattern and test response, as required by the specific scan architecture. This
design has two operation modes: normal-system operation and test. In the test
mode, clocks SCA and SCB are applied alternately to shift a test pattern into
latches LA and LB. Next, the UPDATE clock is applied to move the contents
of LB to PH1. Thus, a test pattern is written into the system flip-flop. Next,
functional clock CLK is applied, which captures the system response to the test
pattern. Finally, the CAPTURE signal is applied to move the contents of PH1 to
LA. The system response is then shifted out by alternately applying clocks SCA
and SCB. During normal system operation, the scan portion is shut off by asserting
logic-0 values to the scan signals (SCA, SCB, UPDATE, and CAPTURE). There
are three basic reasons for using the scan style of Figure 2.8: structural testing
using automated test pattern generation tools, functional testing using signature
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Figure 2.8: Microprocessor scan cell design.
analysis, and efficient post silicon debug. The opportunity for scan reuse for soft-
error protection arises from the redundant scan resources, latches LA and LB in
Figure 2.8, that are unused during normal operation, but add to the occupied area
of the chip and the leakage power during normal operation.
Figure 2.9 shows how reusing the scan flip-flop design can reduce the impact
of soft errors that affect latches. The flip-flop designs test mode operation is
identical to the design in Figure 2.8. In normal system operation mode, the scan
clocks SCA, SCB, UPDATE, and TEST are forced low, while the CAPTURE
signal is forced high. This converts the scan portion into a master-slave flip-flop
that operates as a shadow of the system flip-flop. During normal operation, when
the clock signal CLK is 0, the C-element output drives flip-flop output Q, and the
chip transfers the logic value at input D into latches LA and PH2. During this
time, latches PH1 and LB are susceptible to soft errors because their clock inputs
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are 0 and they are holding logic values. If a soft error occurs in PH1 or LB, the
logic value on O1 will not agree with O2. As a result, the error will not propagate
to output Q, and the keeper will hold the correct logic value at Q. A soft error in
PH2 or LA when CLK = 1 produces similar results. Depending on the systems
speed and the leakage current, the keeper in Figure 2.9 might not be necessary.
Extensive SER simulations on an advanced process technology using an internal
tool show that this design can reduce the SER by more than 20 times compared
to the error rate for an unprotected flip-flop. Any soft error affecting a single latch
inside a flip-flop is guaranteed to be detected by a self checking scan flip-flop that is
obtained by removing the C-element and the associated keeper structure from the
design in Figure 2.9. Various self checking scan cells choices are possible. During
normal operation, at least one copy of correct data exists, under the assumption of
a single error in a latch. To perform self-checking, the approach implements error-
detection circuits such as equality checkers that compare the Q and Q2 outputs of
all such flip-flops in a design and indicate an error each time a mismatch occurs. A
major drawback of such self-checking approach is the significant amount of area
occupied by the logic network that accumulates the error signals generated by
individual flip-flops and produces one or more global error signals.
The error-trapping scan cell shown in Figure 2.10 eliminates this problem.
Latches LA and LB store redundant copies of the PH2 and PH1 content, respec-
tively, during normal operation. A soft error in any latch causes the error signal
(E) to be 1. This signal drives the top input of the exclusive-or gate XOR2 so that
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Figure 2.9: Scan reuse.
when E equals 1, the output of XOR2 (D1) becomes the complement of D. Once
the error signal E is 1, the logic values stored in LA and LB become complements
of the contents of PH2 and PH1, respectively, and E continues to be 1. Thus, the
error is trapped until another soft error affects one of the latches of this flip-flop,
which is a rare event. After a pre-specified number of clock cycles, at a recov-
ery point the system shifts out this trapped error signal using the existing scan
path, which eliminates the need for global routing of error signals at the cost of
error-detection latency. Re-execution then achieves error correction. It is shown
by simulation that there is high gain in soft-error resilience with relatively low
overheads, which justify the use of proposed designs in various applications. Sev-
eral optimizations are possible to further reduce the system-level power overhead
to 3 percent or less. The reuse paradigm for built-in soft-error resilience offers the
following unique advantages over existing soft-error protection techniques: mini-
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Figure 2.10: Error trapping scan cell design.
mal area overhead because resources already available for test and debug can be
reused for soft-error resilience, minimal routing overhead, no major architectural
changes required, applicability to any design including microprocessors, network
processors, ASICs, and a broad spectrum of design choices with several area,
power, performance, and soft-error rate trade offs. For example, the design shown
in Figure 2.9 can be redesigned to achieve a 50 percent rather than a 20 times
reduction in the SER, with a 30 percent reduction in the cell level power overhead.
2.2.3 Error Detection using Checkers
The general idea for achieving error detection and correction is to add some
redundancy (i.e., some extra bits) to a message, which afterward can be used to
check consistency of the output bits, and to recover bits determined erroneous.
Checkers used this concept to detect if an output codeword is correct and correct
36
it if possible [43].
In [44], a novel reduced m out of n coding method is proposed that can be
used for the synthesis of a totally self checker for tolerating soft errors. The
authors propose a totally self-checking synchronous sequential circuits that are
able to recover after an occurrence of a fault, they call the ability of such circuits
self healing ability. The novel reduced m-out-of-n code is based on a Look Up
Table implementation of monotonic functions. For most circuits in a standard
benchmark set, the proposed approach leads to a reduction of about 10-20% of
the overhead as compared with traditional methods.
Three operation modes of the of sequential circuit taking into account that
transient fault might occur are presented as shown in Figure 2.11. They are: free
mode (F), when no faults are observed in the circuit, Erroneous mode (E), when
there is a fault that produces non-code output vector (i.e. wrong output), silent
mode (S), if a non-code next state vector is produced while the output vector is
a codeword.
To illustrate their idea, we consider that two code variables Zi and Zj are
compatible if they are both equal to 1 in at least one codeword, otherwise they
are incompatible. Their idea is based on constructing the reduced m-out-of-n code
by grouping incompatible output code variables in the same subset. The resulting
subsets form a one-to-one correspondence to a specific check bit ci. Check bit ci
is assigned to 1 only if all of their corresponding output code variables equal to 1.
For instance, Table 2.1 shows a reduced codes example. The partitions {{Z1,
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Figure 2.11: Mode transition graph for a transient fault.
Z3, Z4}, {Z2} , {Z5} } have been constructed based on compatibility condition.
For example, Z1 and Z3 are not compatible because both of them are never equal
to 1 in all of the codewords (i.e. rows). Check bits are represented by three right
hand columns in Table 2.1. They can be obtained by c1 = NAND(Z1, Z3, Z4), c2 =
NOT(Z2) and c3 = NOT(Z5). The coding partition {{b1, b3, b4, b6}, {b2, b7} , {b5,
b8} } corresponds to the reduced 3-out-of-8 code. Using such partitioning, a Look-
Up-Table-based (LUT-based) FPGA is designed so that it detects errors on the
set of acceptable codewords listed in Table 2.1. Figure 2.12 shows 8-input LUT-
based FBGA block diagram that is used in the scheme where the corresponding
functions are indicated. The checker detects errors according to two signals, R1
and R2. If R1 6= R2 , the scheme is fault free, otherwise a fault has occurred.
For example, given the codeword 11001000, the checker’s intermediate vari-
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Table 2.1: Reduced codes example.
ables are φ1 = 1, φ2 = 0, φ3 = 1 and φ4 = 0. Hence, R1 = 1 and R2 = 0.
Therefore, R1 6= R2 and the codeword is fault free and is similar to o2. If the
4th bit is in error, the codeword will be 11011000. The checker’s intermediate
variables are φ1 = 1, φ2 = 1, φ3 = 1 and φ4 = 1. Hence, R1 = 1 and R2 = 1.
Therefore, R1 = R2 and the codeword is faulty.
Experimental results show that such an encoding gives better results than
Berger output encoding [45] and the Smith output encoding [46, 47] in terms of
area overhead.
2.2.4 Soft Error Effect Measurement Using Probabilistic
Models
Probabilistic models are often used to measure the effect of soft errors in
systems. The purpose of soft error estimation models is to measure the importance
of combinational and sequential parts of a given circuit. Hence, techniques that
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Figure 2.12: Block diagram of the 3-out-8 checker example.
tackle soft errors are used to selectively harden or protect them.
In [48], an analytical framework to analyze multi-cycle error propagation be-
havior is used and then system flip flops are ranked based on their effects on
system level soft error rate. Using this ranking, flip flops are protected selectively
against soft errors. Soft errors due to single event upsets are the main reliability
threat for digital systems. They have developed a mathematical framework for the
estimation of system failure probability in multiple cycles after the SEU event. By
computing combinational error propagation probabilities between bistables, they
have devised a matrix formulation to represent the probability of error in each
bistable or primary output at any given clock cycle. Based on this formulation,
they have computed mean time to manifest an error (MTTM) for each flip-flop.
In [49], a soft error estimation method is proposed that is faster than the tradi-
tional random fault injection methods. A systematic approach for soft error rate
estimation is developed. The proposed approach leverages the signal probability
calculation, which is already used in other steps of the design flow, and com-
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putes the error propagation probability. Some efficient graph-based algorithms
have been used for this computation. To improve the accuracy of their approach,
they have considered the output dependencies. Experiments on benchmark cir-
cuits and comparison of the results with the random simulation technique show
the effectiveness and the accuracy of their approach. It is about 95% accurate
compared to the random-simulation method while 4-5 orders of magnitude faster.
Their analysis helps the designers to evaluate the vulnerability of gate-level de-
signs to soft errors and the contribution of each gate to the overall SER. Gates
which are contributing most to the overall system vulnerability can be protected
by circuit-level radiation hardening techniques.
In [50], the probability of latching an incorrect value in the system is esti-
mated based on static timing analysis and signal probabilities. They present a
very fast and accurate approach based on enhanced static timing analysis and
signal probabilities to estimate the probability of latching an incorrect value in
the system bistables (timing derating). They have proposed a combined logic and
timing derating estimation method in sequential circuits. The proposed technique
uses an enhanced static timing analysis to derive all possible erroneous waveforms
propagated from a struck gate to reachable flip-flops and calculates the proba-
bility of latching an incorrect value in flip flops. They also exploit a technique
based on signal probability to estimate propagation probabilities. Experimental
results and a comparison with timing accurate Monte-Carlo simulations show that
their proposed technique is 4-5 orders of magnitude faster while the difference in
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accuracy is almost 1% on average.
In [51], a metric is introduced called the critical soft-error rate (CSER) which
covers soft errors that are not masked by the three masking effects, as an alter-
native to conventional SER. The single stuck at fault model is used to estimate
the transient error probability of circuit nodes. Selective hardening is used as a
systematic hardening strategy based on transient error probability as a guide to
improve soft error tolerance.
In [52], an approach for evaluating soft errors effect using symbolic model-
ing based on BDDs/ADDs together with probabilistic model is proposed. It is
concluded that SER decreases below 10−7 FIT (failure in time - one failure in
109 hours of operations) within 10 clock cycles after the hit. Hardware unrolling
techniques are used to tackle soft errors which introduce more hardware to the
system.
Estimation techniques are proposed in [53]. By coupling probability theory
with concepts from testing and logic synthesis, they present accurate and scalable
algorithms for reliability analysis of logic circuits. They described two accurate,
scalable, and highly efficient techniques for reliability analysis of logic circuits.
These techniques have several potential applications, including redundancy-free
reliability optimization, asymmetric and fine-grained redundancy insertion, and
reliability-driven design optimization.
In [54], the authors discussed faults, error bounds and reliability modeling
of nanotechnology-based circuits. They briefly review failure mechanisms and
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fault models in nanoelectronics. Reliability functions based on probabilistic mod-
els are developed for unreliable logic gates. Then, they show that fundamental
gate error bounds for general probabilistic computation can be derived using the
nonlinear mapping functions constructed from the gate models. An analytical ap-
proach based on the probabilistic gate models (PGMs) is proposed for estimating
reliabilities of nanoelectronic circuits. This approach is based on the probabilis-
tic modeling of unreliable logic gates and interconnects which is based on the
iterative execution of PGMs according to a circuits structure. In spite of the
approximations used in probabilistic modeling, their study suggests that the pro-
posed approach provides a simple and efficient way to model the reliability of
nanoelectronic circuits.
2.2.5 Special Techniques
Using verification schemes at the algorithmic level, a method is proposed in [55]
using Ferivalds technique to minimize soft errors effect in combinational matrix
operation. The technique is extended to sequential matrix multiplication. How-
ever, this technique is limited to some applications that use matrix operations
such as image processing.
2.3 Classification of Current Techniques
The current techniques used to tolerate transient errors fall into 3 major
classes: circuit-level hardening, classical hardware redundancy, and time redun-
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dancy techniques.
Circuit level hardening methods are based on special circuit level design for
combinational or sequential elements. Those techniques can be simply injected
in your design by simple replacement and have minimal operation performance
overhead. However, it is expected that they introduce area overhead.
Hardware redundancy methods use classical methods such as triple modular
redundancy (TMR) and concurrent error detection such as duplication, parity
prediction and low cost techniques for matrix operation. Usually it is hard to
integrate such methods in old designs. Moreover they introduce hardware redun-
dancy.
Time redundancy approaches use more operation cycles to recover from faults.
They can be divided into 3 types: software implemented hardware fault tolerance
approaches, Multithreading techniques and multi-strobe methods.
Software implemented hardware fault tolerance approaches take advantage of
software redundancy. In those approaches, program instructions are executed
twice and the results compared to detect errors. Since the instructions run two
times the performance overhead can be more than 100% if we include the time
to compare the results. Moreover, they use special control flow checking tech-
niques. On the other hand, no hardware redundancy is presented. Multithreading
techniques take advantage of software threads by executing the same instruction
sequence using two threads and then compare the results to detect errors. The
performance overhead in this type is reduced compared to Software implemented
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Figure 2.13: Current techniques for soft error tolerance.
hardware fault tolerance approaches. However, it needs high level threading man-
agement protocol to organize the operation. Both of software implemented hard-
ware fault tolerance methods as well as multithreading techniques are usually
applicable for microprocessors operations only. The last time redundancy tech-
nique is multi-strobe methods. The faults are detected and corrected by strobing
outputs of the same combinational logic block multiple times separated by delayed
clocks. It can be selectively injected in some portion of the design unlike the other
2 methods. In addition, they can be applied to unlimited logic blocks.
Figure 2.13 classifies those different techniques and fit our proposed method
in the hierarchy.
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CHAPTER 3
FAULT TOLERANCE USING
STATE REDUNDANCY:
DESIGN LEVEL APPROACH
In this chapter, we will introduce a novel idea to increase sequential circuit
reliability and hence fault tolerance by adding redundant equivalent states to
the states with high probability of occurrence in sequential circuit behavioral
machine. As mentioned in Section 1.1, sequential circuits can be represented by
FSM which contains group of states. If a certain number of states is known to
be more frequent using probability calculations [56–58], it is wise to enforce more
protection upon them by adding redundant states to them. This will increase the
reliability of sequential circuit as it it very likely that the error occurs when the
circuit is either in one of these states or going to one of them. To maintain the
same operation of the unprotected FSM, the newly added redundant states have
46
the same input, next state, and output as the original protected states.
Therefore, to reduce the soft temporal errors effect, we replicate the designated,
to be protected, state with redundant states. The states which have highest
probability of occurrence are the ones that we are going to replicate. Other states
with low probability are kept without adding redundancy. This way the area
overhead is reduced.
According to our knowledge, none of the previous techniques has presented the
introduction of redundant states for states with high probability of occurrence at
the FSM level. This idea introduces a new class of methods that tackle the soft
error effect in early stages, namely the design stage. We can say that, all the
techniques mentioned in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 are under implementation level or
application level methods. Our idea can be considered a design level method as
shown in Figure 2.13.
In the following sections, the type of states that are going to be used through
the thesis is described as an introductory. Then, the proposed design level ap-
proach is discussed in details. After that, the proposed idea is compared with
previous popular methods in terms of how they approach the problem.
3.1 Type of States
The original states of FSM are generated in a way to ensure that the minimum
number of states are used to represent the sequential circuits. Our proposed
method introduces redundant states to some of the original states that happen
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Figure 3.1: State types.
more frequently, so that temporal faults are tolerated. Therefore, we can say that
states in a fault tolerant sequential circuit can be classified into 3 types: normal
states, protected states, and redundant states. Normal states are original states
that are not protected for fault tolerance. Protected states are states that will be
considered for reliability enhancement due to their high probability of occurrence.
For each protected state, equivalent redundant states will be added to guarantee
single soft fault tolerance. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example that shows different
types of states. There are 3 original states in Figure 3.1, 2 of them are protected
and 1 is normal. Each of the 2 protected states has 4 redundant states. The
number of redundant states added will be the minimum number required to satisfy
fault tolerance as it will be discussed in Section 3.3.
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3.2 State Probability Calculation
In order to decide which states of the original states of a finite state machine
need to be protected, states must be sorted based on their probability of occur-
rence. Probabilistic approaches try to correlate the various probabilities in order
to calculate steady state probabilities if the FSM is simulated for infinite amount
of time.
Actually, logic synthesis [59], verification [60], testing [61,62] and more recently,
low-power design [58, 63–67] have benefited from using probabilistic techniques.
In particular, the behavior of FSMs has been investigated using concepts from the
Markov chain (MC) theory. Studying the behavior of the MC provides us with
different variables of interest for the original FSM. In this direction, [63,66,67] are
excellent references where steady-state and transition probabilities (as variables of
interest) are estimated for large FSMs. It is also achieved by repeated application
of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations [58,68].
In our approach, statistical techniques can be fast and accurate since a short
representative sequence for an FSM can be determined. Therefore, we perform
statistical approaches by simulating the state machine using random provided in-
put vectors and determining the state probabilities based on it. Tables 3.1, 3.2
and 3.3 show several ISCAS89 FSM benchmarks with their states sorted in de-
scending order based on the most frequent state. It is done by simulating the FSMs
for about 250000 iteration and recording the counters for each state. The result-
ing steady state probability is calculated by dividing those counters by 250000 for
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each state.
3.3 The Proposed Design Level Approach
In order to reduce the soft temporal errors effect, our design level approach
protects the highly probable states by introducing redundant states to them. By
keeping other states with low probability without adding redundancy, the area
overhead is kept minimal.
To illustrate our idea, sequential circuit model in the presence of redundant
states is explored. Then, state encoding using the minimum number of bits is
discussed. After that, the proposed design level approach that increases fault
tolerance in sequential circuit based on state redundancy is discussed in details.
3.3.1 Sequential Circuit Model in the Presence of Redun-
dant States
Sequential circuit reliability can be increased by adding redundant equivalent
states to the FSM. The redundant states have the same input, next state, and
output as the protected states. In order to illustrate this let us consider the simple
bit flipper example mentioned in Figure 1.2. Given a FSM with two states A and
B, let us assume that both states need to be protected. Originally the FSM needs
only one D-FF to be implemented. To tackle single errors we add redundant
states to A (i.e. A rd0, A rd1 and A rd2) and B (i.e. B rd0, B rd1 and B rd2)
with the same input, output and same next state. For each row in the original
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Table 3.1: FSM benchmark circuits steady state probability: bbara, bbsse, dk14,
lion9, shiftreg, train11, cse, keyb and s1.
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Table 3.2: FSM benchmark circuits steady state probability: planet, pma, s832
and s1494.
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Table 3.3: FSM benchmark circuits steady state probability: sand, styr and tbk.
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Table 3.4: State table of the bit flipper example before and after protection.
state table, additional redundant rows are added in the protected state table as
shown in Table 3.4. The number of the additional rows is equal to the number of
redundant states times the number of rows in the original state table.
In order to detect all single errors, the hamming distance between state A,
and its redundant states should be 1. Similarly for state B, the hamming distance
between it and any of its redundant states should be 1. Therefore, the distance
between states A and B must be kept at least 3. Errors can happen either when
the FSM is in a state (i.e. it happens in one of the FFs) or going to one of them
(i.e. it happens in the combinational logic). The distance-3 relation is necessary
so that any single bit error that occurs while being in or during transition to state
A or B will lead us to equivalent redundant state. Figure 3.2 shows the final
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Figure 3.2: State diagram and encoding with two protected states.
state diagram and encoding after adding the redundant states. In Figure 3.2, the
minimum possible number of bits to represent all protected and redundant states
is 3 bits. This is why we need to add 3 redundant states to cover all single errors
in the state encoding bits. Eventually, we need 3 D-FFs to represent this circuit.
If we use less than 3 D-FFs, this will result into 2 or more redundant states having
the same encoding which is not allowed.
Moreover, SET faults occurring in the combinational logic are protected by
not sharing logic in the combinational logic blocks implementing the next state
equations of memory elements or flip flops. This is done by partitioning the
combinational logic in the input cones of each D-FF so that no single error can
propagate to more than one D-FF. The final block diagram after adding the
redundant states should be as depicted in Figure 3.3.
If soft error tolerance for all states is considered, this might result in exces-
sive area, delay and power overhead. Fortunately, as mentioned in Section 3.2
and shown in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, many sequential circuits have few states
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Figure 3.3: Sequential circuits block diagram with redundant states.
Table 3.5: Steady state probability of benchmark circuit bbsse.
with high probability of occurrence. For example, Table 3.5 shows the steady
state probabilities of state occurrence for benchmark circuit bbsse. As shown,
the probability of state occurrence varies significantly from state to state. Only 3
states out of 13, namely S12, S1 and S2, have relatively high probability of occur-
rence and may be considered for reliability enhancement. Taking advantage of this
and enhancing the reliability of states with the highest probability of occurrence
only, the overall area overhead of the circuit is minimized.
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3.3.2 Calculating the Minimum Number of Bits Used in
State Encoding
The state assignment problem of an FSM can be viewed as a coding problem
or as a partitioning problem [69–72]. The coding problem requires each state
to be assigned a unique binary pattern. Determining the minimum number of
bits required in state encoding after adding the redundant states needs further
investigation. For example, suppose we have only 2 protected states, the number
of bits (or D-FFs) used is 3 bits. With 3 bits we can represent 23 = 8 states.
In Figure 3.4, since we cover all single errors, the hamming distance between
the protected states and the redundant state must be 1. Moreover, the distance
between the redundant states and any other protected state must be more than
1.
In order to specify the number of extra bits needed to encode all states (original
and redundant), we will compute it based on the total number of states. Let m be
the number of the normal states in FSM. Let n be the number of protected states,
and α be the number of bits needed to encode the protected states. Therefore,
α = log2(n). We want to compute the number of extra bits needed, β, in order to
encode all the states.
The total number of bits used in encoding is α+β, which can be used to encode
2α+β states. Each protected state will have α+β redundant states, since all single-
bit errors are considered (i.e. all the distance 1 encodings are redundant to each
protected state). Therefore, the total number of states will be n(1 + α+ β) +m.
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The condition for the number of encoding bits needed is that the number of states
must be less than or equal to the number of possible encodings. Therefore, we
get 2α+β ≥ n(1 + α + β) + m. This inequality can be used to find the minimum
number of bits needed in order to add redundancy to states.
However, we find that this inequality works only with values of n = 2i assuming
that m = 0. This means that if the number of states is not a power of 2, more
conditions must be taken into account. The only condition that we can add is to
ensure that there is no overlapping between redundant states.
To illustrate this, let us assume that 3 states need to be protected with no
normal states. According to the above discussion (22 ∗ 22 ≥ 3(1 + 2 + 2)). Thus,
we use 4-bits to encode them. However, this will result in overlapping between
some of the redundant states. Figure 3.4 shows that states A and C have the
same redundant states namely, 0100 and 1000. Similarly, states B and C have
the same redundant states namely, 1101 and 1110. The correct encoding is to use
5-bits instead of 4-bits. One possible encoding is shown in Figure 3.5.
The hamming distance between states must be calculated carefully to get
the minimum possible number of bits to design our system. To ensure that the
redundant states do not overlap, the minimum possible hamming distance between
the protected states must be at least 3. The reason behind this is to make the
distance between any two different redundant states greater than 0. Table 3.6
gives one possible encoding for a given number of states to be protected.
Notice that in Table 3.6, every state has a hamming distance of 3 or more
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Figure 3.4: Incorrect encoding for 3 states with redundancy.
Figure 3.5: Correct encoding for 3 states with redundancy.
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Table 3.6: A possible encoding for different number of protected states.
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Figure 3.6: Hamming distance between different types of states.
from all other protected states. It must also be ensured that every other state
(protected and redundant) has a hamming distance of at least 2 with each normal
state. Figure 3.6 shows the hamming distance relation between different types of
states.
Lower Bound and Upper bound on Number of Encoded Bits
If we assume that normal states, m = 0, we want to find the lower bound
and the upper bound that enclose the number of bits used to encode the states
in a sequential circuit after protecting the most probable states. Given that:
n: number of protected states; m: number of normal states, α : number of bit
needed to encode all protected states; β: extra bits needed to encode protected
states and their redundant states; α + β: total number of bits used to represent
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FSM; n(1 + α + β): number of protected states and their redundant states. Let
us assume m = 0. If n and α are given, we need to find β such that:
2α+β ≥ n(1 + α + β)
and ,
hamming distance between all the protected states is 3.
This en-quality serves as a lower bound, since we have to cover all the states
(i.e. protected and redundant), while the hamming distance ensures that there is
no overlapping between the different types of states.
The upper bound is 2α+α+α = 23α, because the hamming distance between the
codes of states in the original FSM is 1 and triplicating their codes guarantees a
hamming distance of 3.
If we combine both the lower bound and the upper bound, the resulting in-
quality is: If n and α are given, we need to find β such that:
23α ≥ 2α+β ≥ n(1 + α + β)
or
3α ≥ α + β ≥ log2(n(1 + α + β))
and ,
hamming distance between all the protected states is 3.
In order to illustrate this, let us consider some examples. Assume n = 2 and
α = 1 , we need to find β such that: 3 ≥ 1+β ≥ log2(2(2+β)). Trying β = 1, the
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condition is not satisfied because: 3 ≥ 2 ≥ log2(6) is violating the lower bound.
Trying β = 2, the condition is satisfied because: 3 ≥ 3 ≥ 3 is a correct statement.
Therefore, the only choice we have is to use 3 bits. One chosen codes are: 000
and 111.
Considering another example, assume n = 3 and α = 2, we need to find β
such that: 6 ≥ 2 +β ≥ log2(3(3 +β)). Trying β = 1, the condition is not satisfied
because: 6 ≥ 3 ≥ log2(12) = 3.59 is violating the lower bound. Trying β = 2,
the condition is satisfied because: 6 ≥ 4 ≥ log2(15) = 3.91 is a correct statement.
Trying β = 3, the condition is satisfied because: 6 ≥ 5 ≥ log2(18) = 4.17 is a
correct statement. Trying β = 4, the condition is satisfied because: 6 ≥ 6 ≥
log2(21) = 4.39 is a correct statement. We can choose 4 or 5 or 6 bits, but we
must ensure that the hamming distance between the codes is 3 at least. If we
use 4-bits to encode them; this will result in overlapping between the redundant
states as shown in Figure 3.4. The correct encoding is to use 5-bits instead of
4-bits as shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.7 plots the lower bound and upper bound as well as the actual mini-
mum number of bits used to encode a given number of protected states. Assuming
no normal states, m = 0, the X-axis represents the protected states and Y-axis
represents the number of bits used. As illustrated in the figure, the lower bound is
very tight. Therefore, in order to search for the minimum number of bits used to
encode the protected states, it is better to start from the lower bound and increase
the number of bits until the hamming distance constraint is satisfied. Table 3.7
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Figure 3.7: Lower bound, actual minimum number of bits used, and upper bound.
shows selected number of protected states, their lower bound, actual minimum
number of bits used to encode them, and upper bound. At each 2α + 1, the min-
imum number of bits used to encode the protected states in hand is incremented
either by 1 bit as in 22 + 1, 23 + 1, 25 + 1, 26 + 1, 27 + 1, 28 + 1, 29 + 1, 210 + 1,
212 + 1, 213 + 1 and 214 + 1; or by 2 bits as in 21 + 1, 24 + 1 and 211 + 1.
Noting that the hamming distance condition is more restrictive than the lower
bound condition, we will focus in trying to get hamming distance 3 between the
codes starting from the lower bound as it will be discussed in the next sub-section.
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Table 3.7: Lower bound, actual minimum number of bits used, and upper bound
for a selected number of protected states.
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3.3.3 Algorithm 1: Minimum State Redundancy Algo-
rithm for Fault Tolerance
Since we do not have exact formula for the minimum number of bits used to
encode states in a protected FSM, Algorithm 1 shown in Tables 3.8, 3.9 and
3.10 uses exhaustive search to find codes for protected, redundant and normal
states. The idea is based on protecting few high probable states. Therefore, it
is highly unlikely to have protected states beyond 100 states. Hence, although
exhaustive search methods consume a lot of time to find the solution, in our case
it is acceptable.
Algorithm 1 can be divided into few portions, namely, getting the lower bound,
getting the protected states codes, checking if the normal states are covered by the
remaining codes based on the current number of bits used for encoding, getting the
redundant states codes and finally getting the normal states codes.
In Table 3.8, inputs are the number of protected states and the number of
normal states. After finding α and β, we initialize empty sets for the outputs.
Then, we find the lower bound based on the formula given in Section 3.3.2. Iter-
ations, starting from the lower bound until the protected states are covered, are
inspected by searching for codes with distance 3 between them. In each iteration,
the current codes are tested if they result in new codes with distance 3 between
them. If there are no new codes resulting form the current codes, the current
codes are padded with ”0” from the left and the number of bits used so far is
incremented by 1. Otherwise, the new codes are added to the current ones. The
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outputs, as shown in Table 3.9, are the protected states codes, redundant states
codes and normal states codes along with the minimum number of bits used.
Based on the obtained number of bits used to encode the protected states, the
remaining codes are investigated whether they cover the required normal states.
The remaining codes at this point is basically the possible codes obtained by
current number of bits used minus the number of the protected states and their
redundant states. This amount is 2α+β − n(1 + α + β) where α + β = number of
bits used.
The current number of bits used in the encoding, α + β, is incremented by γ
bits to cover all the normal states, m. The number of extra bits which is needed
to cover all normal states, γ, must satisfy that all the possible codes obtained by,
2α+β+γ, cover the normal states, m, the protected states, n, and their redundant
states, n(α + β + γ). By solving for x in the following equation:
2α+β+x = m+ n(α + β + x+ 1),
the additional number of bits needed to cover all the normal states can be obtained
by γ = dxe.
Another alternative way to find the additional number of bits needed to cover
all the normal states, γ, is by incrementing the current number of bits used to
encode the protected states and their redundant states, α + β, by 1 bit and
investigated the amount: 2α+β − n(1 + α + β) again iteratively until the normal
states are covered.
After that, the redundant states codes are computed for each protected state.
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They are easily found by flipping each bit of the protected state code to get 1
redundant state code at a time. For example, if the protected states code is
”000000”, the one-hot-encoding for 6 bits is the codes for its corresponding 6
redundant states [73]. Then, for each normal state, one of the remaining codes is
assigned to it. This is shown in Table 3.9. Based on Table 3.6, it is required that
each normal state has a hamming distance of 2 between the protected states and
itself. This condition is clearly satisfied since all the distance 1 codes from the
protected states codes are assigned to the redundant states. Finally, the outputs
are reported which are: the protected states codes, the redundant states codes,
normal states codes and the minimum number of bits used to encode all of them.
The core idea of the algorithm is based on how we find codes with distance
3 between them. In Table 3.10, the function, get distance3 codes(), is described.
Taking the current codes for the protected states, and the number of bits currently
used to encode them as arguments, it runs through all the codes obtained from
the current bit used for encoding. For each code of the current protected states
codes, if the distance between the investigated current code and all the the existing
protected states codes is 3 or more, the current code is added to the protected
states codes. Other wise, the next code is investigated and so on.
3.3.4 Complexity of Algorithm 1
The complexity of Algorithm 1 is mainly controlled by the applied method
to find the distance 3 codes between the protected states. As it is required that
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Table 3.8: Algorithm 1.
Inputs
 Get the number of protected states and the number of normal
states as inputs.
Initialize
 Compute α as α = dlog2(protected states)e and let β = 1.
 Let the size of protected state codes = 0.
Lower
bound
 Compute the lower bound by incrementing β iteratively starting
from lower bound = dlog2(protected states(1+α+β))e until α+β ≥
lower bound.
Protected
states  Assign the current number of bits used to the lower bound.
 Let the first protected state code be 0 · · · 00. Its length is the
current number of bits used.
 Increment the size of the protected state codes by 1.
 While the size of the protected state codes is less than the number
of protected states :
– Get all the hamming distance 3 codes from all of the cur-
rent protected state codes using get distance3 codes() (see Ta-
ble 3.10) taking the current number of bits used as an argu-
ment.
– If no new codes are found, the number of bits used is in-
cremented by 1 and all the current protected state codes are
padded with 0 from the left. Otherwise, the new codes are
added to the protected state codes.
Find γ
 Find the extra number of bits needed to encode all the normal
states, γ.
 Increment the current number of bits used by γ.
Redundant
states  For each protected state, assign all hamming-distance-1 codes as
its redundant state codes.
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Table 3.9: Algorithm 1 - continued
Normal
states  Codes that are not used for protected state codes or redundant state
codes are assigned to normal state codes.
Outputs
 Collect protected state codes, redundant state codes, normal state
codes and number of bits used as outputs.
Table 3.10: Algorithm 1 - get distance3 codes.
Get
distance-3
codes
Get distance3 codes() returns a new set of protected state codes with
distance 3 between them starting from the current protected state codes
with a certain number of bits used in the encoding, as follows:
 Run through all bit strings of length equal to the number of bits
used in the encoding indexed by i or until all protected states are
covered.
– Run through all the protected state codes indexed by j.
* Calculate the hamming distance between (code i, code
j).
– If the hamming distance of code i is at least 3 from all the
codes indexed by j, include it in the protected state codes.
 Return the new set of the protected state codes.
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each code in the set of the protected states codes has distance 3 between them,
the search of such codes goes through 3 nested loops. The outer loop is the one
that calls the function get distance3 codes(); it costs roughly (K− lower bound)
where K is the number of bits used to encode the protected state codes. However,
since the this a small number of iterations given that the lower bound is tight, it
can be neglected. The other 2 loops are inside the function get distance3 codes().
The first one runs from 0 to 2K and the other one runs from 0 to n where n is
the number of protected state codes. These two loops cost n ∗ 2K . Therefore, the
complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n ∗ 2K). This cost is acceptable since the number
of protected states is often small.
3.4 Correlation Between State Probability
Based Protection and Failure Rate
In this section, we will explore the relation between the protection of states
according to their probability of occurrence and the failure rate. In order to show
it, the sequential benchmark circuit dk14 is taken as an example. The FSM of
dk14 contains 7 states. Figure 3.8 shows the failure rate of the circuit vs the
number of injected faults, obtained by applying Algorithm 1 to dk14. As shown
in Table 3.11, the states are sorted in descending order of their probability of
occurrence as follows: state-3, state-1, state-2, state-5, state-4, state-6 and state-
7. The original circuit dk14 without adding redundancy has the worst failure rate.
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Figure 3.8: Correlation between state probability based protection and failure rate
for benchmark sequential circuit dk14.
Other versions of dk14 have been built based on state protection. Four pairs of
experiments were made by protecting the highest probable state versus the lowest
one; the two highest probable states versus the two lowest ones; the three highest
probable states versus the three lowest ones; and the four highest probable states
versus the four lowest ones.
Figure 3.8 shows the following relations:
 The failure rate decreases as more states with higher probability of occur-
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Table 3.11: Steady state probability for dk14.
rence are protected. We can see that by comparing the protection of highest
state, 2 highest states, 3 highest states and 4 highest states.
 Protecting the highest probable states is always better than protecting the
lower ones. We can see that by comparing the 4 pairs of experiments, each
pair at a time.
 Protecting 1 or few higher probable states with certain probability is better
than protecting many states with cumulative probability less than the higher
ones. For example, protecting the 2 highest states is better than protecting
the 3 lowest ones.
In summary, there is a strong relation between the state probability based
protection and the failure rate or fault tolerance. Logically, protecting the highest
probable state gives a better fault tolerance than protecting the lowest probable
state. In other words, the failure rate of sequential circuits which involves pro-
tecting states with higher probability of occurrence is less than the ones involving
protecting random or lower state probability.
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3.5 Comparing the Proposed Algorithm with
Other Techniques
Increasing the reliability of sequential circuits has been studied by many re-
searchers. Solutions have been proposed to reduce SEU and SET by approaching
the problem from different perspectives. Most of the popular methods are con-
cerned with the importance of the flip flops in the design. Based on it, protection
methods are adopted to harden or TMR them. Knowing that each next state
variable corresponds to one flip flop function, selective hardening can be applied.
If the designated method protects/Hardens latches against SEU, it might not
protect the combinational logic against SET. Although some approaches protect
sequential circuit against both SEU and SET, they did not necessary protect
against multiple faults, namely SEMU. Moreover, faults that span for more than
one cycle might cause incorrect behavior of the circuit.
In our method, we look at the problem from a different perspective. Rather
than looking at each next state variable, we measure the importance of the states
themselves. The importance of the states is directly related to the state probability
which is more realistic and more close to the behavior model of the FSM of
sequential circuits. In other words, instead of protecting subset of the Flip flops
often presented in the implementation level, we distribute the protection among
all the Flip flops by protecting subset of the states.
In our method we protect sequential circuit against both SET and SEU. More-
over, SEMU can be tolerated if they happen in the same flip flip cone, or if after
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masking result in a single fault. Also, faults (i.e. SEU or SET) that occur in
consecutive cycles are tolerated if a SEU (SET) occurring in one cycle is followed
by a SEU (SET) in the next cycle. Because they will cause the sequential circuit
machine to be in one of the equivalent redundant states. Also, they are tolerated
when a SEU occurring in one cycle is followed by a SET in the next cycle. Be-
cause they will cause the sequential circuit machine to be in one of the equivalent
redundant states. However, if a SET occurring in one cycle is followed by a SEU
in the next cycle, they might cause double fault that cause the sequential circuit
machine to be in a different non-equivalent state. To achieve tolerance against
these kind of faults, two levels of redundant states are needed.
To show this, let us consider the simple example depicted in Figure 3.2. Two
states are protected using level 1 redundant states only which ensures protection
against single faults that are spanning for one cycle. Figure 3.9 shows protection of
these 2 states using two levels of redundant states. This time protection of faults
that are spanning for 2 cycles is guaranteed. This means when a fault happens
in the original protected states it leads to one of the level 1 equivalent redundant
states. If another fault happens while being in one of the level 1 redundant stats,
either it leads to one of the level 2 redundant states or it brings the machine
back to the original protected state if the 2nd fault overwrites the first one. For
example, if the FSM was in the protected state ”00000” and a fault happens in the
first bit, it will lead to an equivalent redundant state ”00001” which is one of level
1 redundant states. If in the 2nd cycle another fault hit the 3rd bit, for example,
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it will lead to ”00101” which is another level-2 equivalent redundant state of the
state ”00000”. Moreover, if in the 2nd cycle a fault happens in the first bit again
that toggles it from ”1” to ”0”, the FSM returns back to ”00000” which is the
original protected state.
However, adding a second level of redundant states will produce area overhead
much larger than using a first level. Also, it complicates the hamming distance
condition between the protected states. For example, In Figure 3.2 we used 3
bits to encode all the states and 3 redundant states are added to each of the two
protected states. Hence, the total amount of states is 8 for protecting 2 states.
On the other hand, protecting them using 2 level redundant states will cost us 10
redundant states at level 1 and 20 at level 2. The total amount of states will be
32 for protecting 2 states which is encoded using 5 bits. Hence, the area overhead
is increased in terms of the number of D-FFs as well as the combinational logic
witch are directly affected by the number of states in the FSM. Moreover, the
hamming distance between the protected states using two level redundant states
should be at least 5 compared to 3 for one level redundant states. Hence, more
bits should be added to the original state encoding to ensure that no 2 redundant
states have the same encoding.
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Figure 3.9: State encoding with two protected states using 2 level of redundant
states.
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3.6 Framework of Enhancing Fault Tolerance
Using Algorithm 1
Our method presented in this chapter, gives a procedure that enables protect-
ing highest probable states to achieve tolerance against soft errors. Dynamically,
sequential circuits reliability can be increased as more states with high probability
of occurrence are protected. The area overhead is also increased as a result. This
is the case up to a certain point at which less drop in failure rate is achieved at
a higher area overhead price. By adopting this method, the following framework
should be applied in the design procedure, as shown in Figure 3.10:
1. Given a sequential circuit represented by a state table or finite state machine
(FSM).
2. Calculate the steady state probability of all the states in the FSM as shown
in Section 3.2.
3. Protect the chosen high probable states using Algorithm 1 by introducing
redundant equivalent states as shown in section 3.3.
4. Synthesize/implement the sequential circuit.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have introduced a novel idea, presented as Algorithm 1,
to increase sequential circuit reliability and hence fault tolerance by introducing
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Figure 3.10: Framework of Algorithm 1.
redundant equivalent states to the states with high probability of occurrence in
sequential circuit behavioral machine. To maintain the same operation of the
unprotected FSM, the newly added redundant states have the same input, next
state, and output as the original states. Other states with low probability are
kept without adding redundancy to minimize the area overhead.
We divided the original states of sequential circuits into protected states with
high probability of occurrence and normal states with low probability of occur-
rence. For each protected state, equivalent redundant states are added to guaran-
tee single soft fault tolerance. We also derived a lower and upper bounds for the
actual minimum number of bits needed to encode the states in the protected FSM.
The lower bound is found to be very tight and actually is equal to the minimum
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number of bits used in state encoding when the number of protected states is a
power of 2.
The analysis of the problem suggests that the hamming distance between the
protected states codes should be at least 3 to be able to add redundancy to them
without code overlapping between their redundant states.
We found that there is a strong relation between the state probability based
protection using algorithm 1 and the failure rate or fault tolerance. In other
words, the failure rate of sequential circuits which involves protecting states with
high probability of occurrence is less than the ones involving protecting random
or lower state probability.
According to our knowledge, none has presented the introduction of redundant
states for states with high probability of occurrence at the FSM level. This idea
introduces a new class of methods that tackle the soft error effect in early stages,
namely the design stage.
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CHAPTER 4
ENHANCING RELIABILITY
TO AREA OPTIMIZED
SEQUENTIAL CIRCUITS
It is well known that state assignment has a significant impact on several design
parameters including area, power and testability. In this chapter, we explore the
impact of state assignment on the fault tolerance of sequential circuits. Then, we
propose an algorithm, Algorithm 2, which enhances reliability to area optimized
sequential circuit.
In the following sections, we start by inspecting the impact of state assign-
ment on sequential circuit reliability. As will be demonstrated, changing state
assignment has low impact on increasing fault tolerance. Hence, we target op-
timizing one criteria, area, in sequential circuits. After that, we will introduce
our proposed algorithm which enhances reliability and optimizes area for sequen-
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tial circuits and discuss it in details. Eventually, the framework that should be
followed by adopting our method is presented.
4.1 Impact of State Assignment on Sequential
Circuit Reliability
The computational complexity for finding the best state assignment that gives
the best reliability for a sequential circuit is an NP-hard problem [58, 74–77].
There are huge number of possibilities to choose from in order to assign codes
to states. For example, assume that in the benchmark circuit dk14 we want to
protect 2 states out of 7 states. According to Algorithm 1, the minimum number
of bits needed to encode them is 4 bits. we choose from the possible 16 bit strings
7 codes to encode 7 states. In order to find what is the best encoding in this case,
the number of choices we have is given by: p!
(p−s)! , where p is the possible number
of bit strings available to encode the states; and s is the number of states. Thus,
in our example, the resulting number of possible ways to encode the states is 16!
9!
which is more than 57 million ways.
If we take into account the distance-3 relation between the protected states,
the number of ways can be reduced. Form the 4 bits required to encode the states,
we choose 3 bits to be complemented in the other state code. This way we ensure
the distance-3 relation. Hence, there are
(
4
3
)
8 = 4 ∗ 8 = 32 ways to assign codes
to the protected states. For each way of them, there are 8 associated redundant
82
states. So, the remaining 5 normal states are permuted out of 14− 8 = 6 possible
codes. Therefore, the total number of ways is reduced to 32 * 6!
1!
= 32∗720 = 23040
ways. Although 23040 is a small number of ways compared to 57 million, it is still
a large number of experimental tests to point out the best encoding among them.
Actually Algorithm 1 reported in Section 3.3 assumes that the first protected
state code is going to be all zeros and the normal states are found by first found
first chosen. Hence, there is only one way to assign states using Algorithm 1. Using
the codes produced from Algorithm 1 compared with 4 other different codes, it
is found that the impact of changing the state assignment to the failure rate (i.e.
reliability) is minimal. For example, Table 4.1 shows 5 different codes used by
protecting 4 states out of 7 in dk14 FSM. Algorithm 1 produces codes with the
minimum number of bits used in the encoding, 5 bits in our case. The other 4
codes are chosen randomly and happen to be codes of 6 bits length. Notice that
all these codes satisfy the hamming distance constraint between the top 4 states
that are chosen for protection (i.e. the hamming distance between the protected
states is at least 3). Hence, all single faults are tolerated if the FSM is in one of
the protected states.
Regardless of their code length, the failure rate for all the codes is very close
to each other as shown in Figure 4.1. They are compared to the original circuit
without adding protection. The failure rate is greatly reduced compared to the
original circuit. However, all the 5 codes have almost the same failure rate. This
is explained by the behavior of the FSM of dk14 after adding the protection which
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Table 4.1: Different state assignment for dk14.
is not related to the state assignment. Similar behavior is observed for sequential
benchmark circuit bbara which will be discussed in Section 6.4.
4.2 Area Optimization in Sequential Circuits
Since state assignment has low impact on reliability, there is no point of try-
ing to find the best state encoding or assignment that gives the best reliability.
Instead, it is better that we target optimizing area in sequential circuits and then
enhance its reliability. To optimize area for sequential circuit, state minimization
and state encoding play an important role.
After state minimization is performed, a set containing minimum number of
states is produced representing the finite state machine (FSM) on hand. Encoding
the resulting states affects both the number of storage elements used as well as
the combinational logic. Encoding for finite state machines has traditionally been
targeted for reducing the complexity of its combinational part. A good survey of
FSM encoding for area can be found in [78]. The number of possible combinations
to encode FSM is exhaustively large. It is given by: 2
nb!
(2nb−s)! , where nb is the
number of bits used to encode the states and s is the number of states themselves.
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Figure 4.1: Impact of state assignment on sequential circuit reliability.
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Thus, exhaustive evaluation is not feasible and heuristics are generally employed
to tackle the problem of FSM encoding.
One of the famous methods for state encoding to optimize area is symbolic
minimization [79] which will be discussed in the next sub-section. Taking advan-
tage of symbolic minimization, nova [80] reduces the area of sequential circuits
and is adopted in our work.
4.2.1 Two Level Symbolic Minimization and Multiple
Level Models
Logic minimization aims to optimize the area of sequential circuit by opti-
mizing the combinational logic of an FSM. This in turn depends on the degree
of freedom provided by an efficient FSM encoding. A good encoding can help
the logic minimizer to achieve a better realization in terms of logic cost. Logic
minimizers employ different heuristics for two-level and multilevel circuits as their
cost measures differ.
A two level implementation realizes a logic function as a sum of product terms.
The circuit complexity of such a representation is related to the number of inputs,
outputs, number of product terms and number of variables utilized in a product
term, i.e. the number of literals.
The simplest way to encode an FSM is by assigning 1-hot state codes. In
1-hot encoding for a state, the corresponding code bit for a state is set to 1 and
all others to 0. Thus, 1-hot encoding is a case of non-minimal state assignment
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Table 4.2: Implicant merging.
such that the number of variables required is equal to the number of states. It is
further noticed in [79,81] that such an encoding is poor to minimizing the size in
sum of products representation.
The complexity of a two level realization can be reduced by using mechanisms
such as implicant merging, code covering and disjunctive coding [78]. The idea be-
hind Implicant Merging is to assign adjacent codes to states that produce either
the same next-state or output or both at similar input conditions. This yields
bigger cubes while doing Karnaugh minimization, and results in a simpler final
expression. Implicant merging, as shown in Table 4.2, requires adjacency con-
straints to be met by the state assignment algorithm. In Table 4.2, S1, S2, S3 are
merged into one state with code 0– because they have the same input, next state
and output.
Code Covering involves a code word of a state covering a code word of some
other state(s), i.e. all the bit positions for which the second code word is 1,
correspond to 1 in the first code word. An example utilizing code covering is
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Table 4.3: Code covering.
illustrated in Table 4.3. Assume that S1 is encoded with 110 and S2 with 100.
In this case, the input condition (s, 001) can be treated as don’t care condition
for the next state S2, reducing the cover cardinality from three to two. Covering
constraints produce covering codewords.
Reducing cover cardinality using Disjunctive Coding is illustrated in Table 4.4.
Disjunctive constraints require that the disjunction of state codes is equal to some
other state code. In the example shown, the states are encoded such that the code
for S2 is the disjunction of the state codes for S1 and S3. As such, the second
implicant with the input field 101 gets contained in other input conditions and
thus is completely saved.
The problem with many approaches to two-level assignment is that no exact
predictions are possible, as to how the satisfaction of coding conditions affects
the complexity of the resulting combinational logic, since the different coding
conditions interact with each other in a complex way. The application of coding
constraints and finding out their effect would be excessively costly as it would
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Table 4.4: Disjunctive coding.
require a huge number of logic minimizations.
To mitigate this problem, [79] proposed an elegant solution of symbolic mini-
mization. Symbolic minimization has been proposed to take into account the effect
of the encoding on the next state part. It is a technique that yields a minimal
encoding-independent sum-of-products representation of a symbolic function. It
builds up a directed acyclic graph (DAG), where the nodes are the next states and
an edge (u, v) corresponds to the covering constraint (called output constraint)
that the code of u covers bit-wise the code of v. The translation of the cover ob-
tained by symbolic minimization into a compatible Boolean representation defines
simultaneously a face hypercube embedding problem and an output covering prob-
lem (called ordered face hypercube embedding). Moreover, output minimization
techniques may be seen as setting disjunctive constraints on the codes of the sym-
bolic states (the code of some states is the logical disjunction of the codes of two or
more other states). Finding a compatible Boolean representation entails solving
a difficult encoding problem based on input, output, and disjunctive constraints.
Therefore, by using symbolic minimization techniques, it is possible to opti-
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mize the function independently of the encoding and determine the codes at a later
time. This requires performing the minimization at the symbolic level, before the
encoding. As a summery, symbolic minimization is actually a mixed encoding for
both input and output. It takes advantage of implicant merging, code covering
and disjunctive coding to minimize the circuit on hand while holding the result-
ing constraint from those relations which is input constrains, output constrains,
covering constraints and disjunctive constraints.
In contrast to two level circuits, multiple level circuits provide much more
degree of freedom in optimizing combinational network and satisfying coding con-
straints. This is because of the flexibility provided due to operations such as com-
mon subexpression extraction and factorization. Unfortunately, it comes with an
increase in the difficulty of modeling and optimizing the multilevel network them-
selves. The complexity measure for multilevel circuits is the encoding length and
the number of literals in the optimized logic network. Since encoding length is
mostly taken constant, literal saving by extracting common subexpressions has
been the focus of most of the work done for multilevel FSM optimization. This
involves finding the state pairs which when encoded carefully can result in ex-
tracting common subexpressions. In contrast to two level circuits, state pairs in
multilevel implementations do not necessarily have to be given adjacent codes.
If two states have n state bits in common, the combination of the two states re-
sult in a common subexpression with n literals. To identify the states to assign
close codes, two heuristics proposed by [82, 83] standout. The first called fanout
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oriented, tries to assign closer codes to the states that have same next state tran-
sition. The rationale is to maximize the size of common cube by assigning closer
codes (lesser hamming distance) to such states. The second approach is referred
to as fan-in oriented in which state pairs with incoming transitions from the same
states are given high weights for closer code assignment. Here the motivation is
to maximize the frequency of common cubes in the encoded next state function.
Rules for detecting potential common cubes for more precise evaluation of literal
savings have been proposed in [84].
4.2.2 State Assignment Using Nova
In [80] heuristics for optimal state assignment of FSMs based on the solution
of face hypercube embedding and ordered face hypercube embedding have been pro-
posed. Based on symbolic minimization, the proposed theoretical framework offers
substantial advantages over previous approaches to develop effective algorithms.
The algorithms are part of nova, a program for optimal encoding of control logic,
available as a tool of the Berkeley logic synthesis system [85, 86]. Some of the
heuristics that are part of nova perform the following:
 Solve face hypercube embedding problem.
 Propose an exact algorithm that finds an encoding satisfying all input con-
straints and minimizing the encoding length.
 Propose heuristic encoding algorithms that maximize input constraint sat-
isfaction.
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 Present heuristic encoding algorithm that maximizes simultaneous input and
output constraint satisfaction, according to an appropriately defined metric.
For detailed information and pseudo codes of nova’s heuristics and algorithms
mentioned above, the reader can access nova detailed paper in [80].
Although nova targets two-level logical implementations, it is found that the
final literal counts in a factored form of the logic when encoded by nova are
30% less than the literal counts obtained by the best of a number of random
state assignments. Comparisons with Mustang [83] in the two-level and multilevel
case are also reported. Even though nova was not designed as a multilevel state
assignment program, its performance compares successfully with Mustang. Hence,
nova is adopted in our work.
4.3 Algorithm 2: Enhancing Reliability and Op-
timizing Area for Sequential Circuits
Given an area optimized sequential circuit with a certain obtained state as-
signment using nova, Algorithm 2 builds fault tolerance layer on top of that opti-
mization. Algorithm 2 (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6) protects high probable states
by introducing associated equivalent redundant states to them the same way Al-
gorithm 1 did. Instead of starting from empty set, Algorithm 2 takes the state
encoding resulting from a certain enhancing heuristic, nova in our case, and ap-
pend bits to the left of the codes until a distance 3 relation between the protected
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states is obtained.
Algorithm 2 is divided into the following parts: getting the protected states
codes, checking if the normal states are covered by the remaining codes based on
the current number of bits used to encode them, getting the redundant states codes
and finally getting the normal states codes.
The inputs are the state codes achieved by optimizing the sequential circuit
for a certain constraint, area for example. They include the protected state codes
and normal states codes. In the initial stage, the current number of bits used to
encode the states is set to the number of bits used by the given codes. Also the
redundant states set is initialized to empty set.
Starting with the protected states codes given as an input, we append them
from the left bit by bit. By appending each one of them by 1 bit, we form a bit
vector constructed from all the bits that are added to them. Then, we choose the
best bit vector that gives the maximum number of distance-3 codes in the set of
the protected state codes. While the hamming distance between all the protected
states is less than 3, we append or pad the current protected state codes with 1 bit
and search for the best distance between codes that are guaranteed by the best bit
vector. For example, shown in Figure 4.2 are 2 bit vectors which are added to r
protected states. They are vt = B0t, B1t, ..., Brt and vt+1 = B0t+1, B1t+1, ..., Brt+1.
Each bit B can be either 0 or 1 depending on the the best distance codes.
The heuristic by which we get the protected states codes is further explained
by the function get best distance codes() shown in Table 4.6. This function is
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called with the current protected state codes and the current number of bits used
to encode them as arguments. The bit vector can have any binary bit string from
0 to 2Numberofcodes − 1. We inspect the current bit vector i by calculating the
hamming distance between the protected codes after padding them with i the
same way as shown in Table 4.2. For each i, we calculate how many codes with
distance-3 or above as well as codes with distance-2 as a cost counters. The bit
vector with the most distance-3 codes is selected. In addition, if 2 or more bit
vectors have the same number of distance-3 codes, the one with more distance-2
codes is selected. We keep calling get best distance codes() as long as the distance
between all the protected state codes is less than 3.
After we get the protected state codes, the remaining codes and the redundant
state codes are obtained in the same manner as explained in Algorithm 1 in
Section 3.3. The remaining codes is 2α+β − n(1 + α + β) where α + β is the
current number of bits used in the encoding of the protected states as well as
their redundant states. The additional number of bits needed to cover all the
normal states, γ, is also obtained in the same manner as it is derived in Algorithm
1. However, getting the normal states codes slightly differs from how they are
obtained in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, codes that are not used for protected or
redundant states are simply picked for normal states. On the other hand, normal
state codes are already given as inputs in Algorithm 2. However, since protected
states codes are computed by padding bits to the left until 3 hamming distance
is obtained, normal state codes must be padded with the same number of bits
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Figure 4.2: Two bit vectors added to protected states codes.
as the protected states. Therefore, we check the bit strings that result from the
concatenation between each of the original normal state codes and i where i can
be any binary string from 0 to 2a where a is the the number of the left padded
bits that makes the normal state codes length equal to the number of bits used
for protected and redundant state codes. If the resulting bit string is not used
for protected states or redundant states, then it is assigned to one of the normal
states.
The outputs of Algorithm 2 are the protected states codes, the redundant
states codes, normal states codes and the minimum number of bits used to encode
all of them as shown in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Algorithm 2.
Inputs
 Get the protected states codes and the normal states codes, which
optimize the sequential circuit for area, as inputs.
Initialize
 Let the number of bits used = length of one of the protected state
codes.
Protected
states  While the hamming distance between the protected state codes is
less than 3:
– Increment the current number of bits used by 1.
– Find the best bit vector padding to the protected state codes
using get best distance codes().
Find γ
 Find the extra number of bits needed to encode all the normal
states, γ.
 Increment the current number of bits used by γ.
Redundant
states  For each protected state, assign all hamming-distance-1 codes as
its redundant state codes.
Normal
states  Check the concatenation of each of the original normal state codes
and i where i can be any binary string from 0 to 2a − 1 where a
is the number of the left padded bits that makes the normal state
codes length equal to the current number of bits used. If it is not
used for protected states or redundant states, assign it to one of
the normal states until all normal states are covered.
Outputs
 Collect protected state codes, redundant state codes, normal state
codes and number of bits used as outputs.
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Table 4.6: Algorithm 2 - get best distance codes.
Get best
distance
codes
Get best distance codes() returns the set of protected state codes which
has the best hamming distance between them after padding them with
the best bit vector, as follows:
 Let the best bit vector = all zeros.
 Run through all bit vectors indexed by i.
– Check hamming distances between protected state codes after
temporally padding them with the bit vector i.
– Evaluate the current bit vector i based on the hamming dis-
tance between the protected state codes. The bit vector i with
the most hamming distance 3 pairs of protected state codes is
selected. Ties are broken by counting the hamming distance
2 codes pairs.
– If i is better than the current best bit vector, bit vector i
replaces it.
 Pad the protected state codes with the best bit vector from the left.
 Return the protected state codes.
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4.3.1 Complexity of Algorithm 2
Finding protected states codes are the key point to compute the complexity of
Algorithm 2. To find them, we run through 4 nested loops. In the outer loop as
shown in Table 4.5, we keep padding bits to the state codes in each iteration to
the point where the overall distance between all the protected states codes are 3
or above. This operation takes N −M iterations where N is the resulting number
of bits used to encode the protected state codes and M is the original number
of bits used to encode the given protected state as inputs. In order to find the
best bit vector in each iteration, we run through all the possible combinations
formed by the bit vectors from 0 to 2K−1 (see Table 4.6), where K is the number
of the given protected state codes. For each bit vector, the distance between the
protected state codes are checked. The checking operation takes O(K2) iterations.
Therefore, the overall complexity of Algorithm 2 is O((N −M)2KK2).
4.3.2 Expected Area Overhead of Algorithm 2
The resulting area overhead is kept minimal because we start from an opti-
mized state codes using nova. The reason of this is analyzed by the corresponding
equations of the D type flip flops that are used to build the sequential circuit.
The equations of the flip flops are represented in a sum of products form which
contains a set of cubes. The area overhead in the protected sequential circuit is
related to the original set of cubes that are resulting from optimizing its area.
Since we started from an optimized set of cubes that gives a minimized area, it
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is expected to give a local minimum in the protected version of the sequential
circuit. Actually, the protected D type flip flop equations of the fault tolerant
circuit are generated by the following rules:
1. A cube C in the original equation of an FSM will remain as is in the equation
of the protected FSM unless:
(a) The cube C overlaps with one of the redundant states of other protected
states not covered by the cube.
(b) The cube C overlaps with a code X in the original FSM that was as-
signed a don’t care and in the protected FSM is assigned to a redundant
state that assigns its value to 0.
The cube C will become C # (overlapped codes) where # is the sharp
operator. This will result in additional literal(s) and/or splitting the cube
C into 2 or more cubes.
2. For each cube C, extra cubes will be added to cover the codes for redundant
states that are not covered by C.
3. Cubes in the newly added state variables due to protection are mostly cubes
from other original state variables or reduced version of them.
These rules are explained by two examples. The FSM of the first example is
shown in Figure 4.3. It contains 2 states originally coded as shown in Table 4.7.
After minimization, the equations for the state variable v1 and output are (See
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K-map in Table 4.8):
v1 = av¯1 + a¯v1;
z1 = av¯1 + a¯v1;
Figure 4.3: FSM example with 2 states.
Table 4.7: State codes of the original FSM shown in Figure 4.3.
Table 4.8: FF and output function cubes shown in K-map of the original FSM
shown in Figure 4.3.
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Assuming that we protect both S0 and S1 by applying Algorithm 2 detailed
in Section 4.3, we obtain the protected states codes shown in Table 4.9. After
minimizing, the equations for the state variables v1, v2, v3 and output are (See
K-map in Table 4.10):
v1 = av¯1v¯2 + av¯1v¯3 + a¯v1v2 + a¯v1v3 + av¯2v¯3 + a¯v2v3;
v2 = av¯1v¯2 + av¯1v¯3 + a¯v1v2 + a¯v1v3 + av¯2v¯3 + a¯v2v3;
v3 = av¯1v¯2 + av¯1v¯3 + a¯v1v2 + a¯v1v3 + av¯2v¯3 + a¯v2v3;
z = av¯1v¯2 + av¯1v¯3 + a¯v1v2 + a¯v1v3 + av¯2v¯3 + a¯v2v3;
Table 4.9: State codes of the protected FSM shown in Figure 4.3.
By applying the rules, cube 1 (av¯1) in the original equation of v1 is sharped
(using # operation) into 2 cubes, cube 1-1 (av¯1v¯2) and cube 1-2 (av¯1v¯3); likewise,
cube 2 (a¯v1) is sharped into, cube 2-1 (a¯v1v3) and cube 2-2 (a¯v1v2). The reason
for that is explained in condition 1(a). Cube 1 (av¯1) is overlapping with the
redundant state with the code (110), so it is sharped. In the same manner, cube
2 (a¯v1) is overlapping with the redundant state with the code (001). As stated
in condition 2, cube 3 (av¯2v¯3) and cube 4 (a¯v2v3) in the protected equation are
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Table 4.10: FF and output function cubes shown in K-map of the protected FSM
shown in Figure 4.3.
added since they are not covered by cube 1 (av¯1) and cube 2 (a¯v1) in the original
equation, respectively. Cube 3 (av¯2v¯3) is added to cover the condition for the
redundant states (001) and cube 4 (a¯v2v3) is added to cover the condition for the
redundant state (110). The same rules apply for the output function z.
As a second example, Figure 4.4 shows a FSM of a sequential circuit with 3
states. The original state codes are shown in Table 4.11. After minimization, the
equations for the state variables v1, v2 and output are (See K-map in Table 4.12):
v1 = av¯1 + a¯v1 + v2;
v2 = av¯1 + a¯v2;
z1 = a;
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Figure 4.4: FSM example with 3 states.
Table 4.11: State codes of the original FSM shown in Figure 4.4.
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Table 4.12: FF and output function cubes shown in K-map of the original FSM
shown in Figure 4.4.
Applying Algorithm 2 to protect S0, we get the state encoding shown in
Table 4.13. After adding protection to S0, the equations for the state variables
v1, v2, v3 and output are (See K-map in Tables 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16):
v1 = av¯1 + a¯v1v3 + v1v2 + av¯3;
v2 = av¯1 + a¯v1v2 + av¯2v¯3;
v3 = av1v2 + a¯v1v3;
z1 = a;
For state variable v1, cube 1 (av¯1) is kept the same as it does not overlap with
other protected states or redundant states codes. Cube 2 (a¯v1) of the original FSM
is sharped into cube 2 (a¯v1v3) in the protected FSM which has 1 extra literal as
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stated in 1(a) because cube 2 (a¯v1) overlaps with the redundant state with the
code (001). However, cube 3 (v2) in the original circuit is sharped by adding
1 extra literal to cube 3 (v1v2) in the protected equation because it overlapped
with the code (010) which is assigned to don’t care at the original code (10) in
the original FSM and to 0 in the protected FSM. This is stated in condition 1(b).
Cube 4 (av¯3) is added to take care of the redundant state (001) as stated in
condition 2. To complete the picture for state variable v2, cube 1 (av¯1) is kept
the same as it does not overlap with other protected states or redundant states
codes. Cube 2 (a¯v2) in the original FSM is sharped into cube 2 (a¯v1v2) in the
protected FSM because cube 2 (a¯v2) overlaps with the redundant state with the
code (010). Finally, redundant state (001) is covered by cube 3 (av¯2v¯3).
Table 4.13: State codes of the protected FSM shown in Figure 4.4.
As mentioned in condition 3, in both example 1 and 2, the cubes in the equa-
tions of the extra state variables, which are added for protection, are also cubes
in the other state variables equations or a reduced version of them. In example 1,
equations of v2 and v3 contain the same cubes contained in the equation of v1.
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Table 4.14: State variable v1 function cubes shown in K-map of the original FSM
shown in Figure 4.4.
Table 4.15: State variable v2 function cubes shown in K-map of the original FSM
shown in Figure 4.4.
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Also in example 2, v3 has cube 2 (a¯v1v3) in the protected FSM which is cube
2 (a¯v1v3) in v1; and it has cube 1 (av1v2) which is a reduced version of cube 3
(v1v2) in v1.
As explained earlier, Algorithm 2 suggests adding extra bits to the original
codes which ensure hamming distance of 3 between the protected states. In ex-
ample 1, this addition converts the code of the original state S0 from (0) to (000)
and S1 from (1) to (111) as shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.9. This conversion leads to
add 2 more state variables, v2 and v3, with the same truth values as the original
state variable v1 (i.e. the columns of v3 and v2 in Table 4.9 are the same as col-
umn v1). Hence, the D-type FF equations of v2 and v3 is directly affected in state
table level and takes the same cubes in v1 equation. In example 2, Tables 4.11
and 4.13 show that the additional state variable v3 is covered by state variable
v1 (i.e. column v3 in Table 4.13 is covered by column v1) which explains the fact
that v3 has cube(s) from v1 or reduced version of them.
Although the newly added state variables can have cubes from other original
state variables or reduced version of them as seen in example 1 and 2 as stated
in condition 1, it is not the general case for all sequential circuits. Because an
additional state variable can have truth values (i.e. (0)s and (1)s) that are not
covered by other state variables. Fortunately, the similarity and coverage relations
are very likely to happen between additional and original state variables because
of the hamming distance relation between the protected states which will directly
affect the D-type FF equations of the new state variables.
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4.4 Framework of Enhancing Fault Tolerance
Using Algorithm 2
Algorithm 2 protects a sequential circuit that is already optimized for a certain
criteria. Taking area as an example, the following framework should be applied
in the design procedure, as shown in Figure 4.5:
1. Given a sequential circuit represented by a state table or finite state machine
(FSM).
2. Assign states codes for the FSM taking into account optimizing the criteria
on hand (i.e. area).
3. Calculate the steady state probability of all the states in the FSM.
4. Protect the chosen high probable states using Algorithm 2 by introducing
redundant states to them as shown in Section 4.3.
5. Synthesis/implement the sequential circuit.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, state assignment is explored and found to have a minimal im-
pact on soft error tolerance of sequential circuits. Hence, Algorithm 2 is proposed
by starting from a state assignment or state encoding that optimizes a certain
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Table 4.16: State variable v3 function cubes shown in K-map of the original FSM
shown in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.5: Framework of Algorithm 2.
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criteria such as area or power. Fault tolerance can be added on top of the initial
state assignment and the optimization is kept.
An optimized sequential circuit for area using nova can be enhanced by adding
a layer of protection using state redundancy by adding extra bits to the left of
chosen protected states encoding that have high probability of occurrence. As
the original encoding of the protected states optimizes area on one hand, the
extra added bits, which guarantee a hamming distance of 3 between the protected
states, result in fault tolerance property on the other hand.
Since we started from a minimum point of area overhead which results from
the original state encoding, the resulting area overhead in the protected circuit
remains minimal. This is explained by the fact that cubes from the original FSM
are actually either kept the same, result in a reduced form of them (more literals
are added), split into two or more cubes, or/and additional cubes are added to
cover the redundant states.
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
AND FRAMEWORK
To show the impact of our proposed algorithms in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4,
a reliability evaluator based on Monte-carlo simulation is implemented. In this
chapter, we will describe the simulation environment that our reliability evaluator
uses to report fault tolerance measurement of ISCAS89 benchmark sequential
circuits. In the following sections, we will describe how we measure a sequential
circuit reliability. Then, a Monte-carlo based simulation is presented which details
the framework of our reliability evaluator. Some assumptions regarding fault
tolerance evaluator has been made and listed too. After that, a stuck-at fault
model is chosen and the fault injection mechanism is explored.
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5.1 Measuring Sequential Circuit Reliability
Comparing the reliability of original sequential benchmark circuits with their
protected version, using our methods, or with other techniques is done by mea-
suring the failure rate per injected faults. Knowing that reliability is inversely
proportional to failure rate, varying the number of faults injected to the sequen-
tial benchmark circuits and measuring the failure rate for each injected fault is an
effective way to measure their fault tolerance (or reliability). Logically, circuits
reliability starts from 100% when no faults injected/occur and decrease as the
number of faults increases. In other words, the failure rate grows as the number
of faults increases.
Sequential circuits reliability is also directly affected by the logical, electrical
and time masking which depends on their actual implementation. Masking prop-
erties are reflected by the measurement of failure rate against the number of faults
as more masking implies less failure rate. In addition, our technique presents state
protection which reduces the failure rate and hence increases reliability. In sum-
mary, by plotting fault rate against the number of injected faults in sequential
circuits, reliability, masking as well as protection are measured.
For evaluating circuit failure probability and reliability based on unit error
probability, a simulation-based reliability model as the one used in [87] is often
adopted. However, since we eventually plot the failure rate against the number
of injected faults, we modified it to our need as it will be explained in the next
section.
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5.2 The Simulation Framework of Reliability
Evaluator
Our implemented reliability evaluator goal is to measure the failure rate of
sequential circuits as the number of injected faults grows. It is done by using
Monte-carlo estimation methods. For each circuit, we find the failure rate by
injecting faults for certain number of iterations and counting the number of success
and failed iterations. The frame work of getting the failure rate of a circuit is as
stated in the following points:
 For every number of faults F from 1 to N , where N is the maximum number
of injected faults:
– Set the number of failed iterations, k, the number of protected itera-
tions, p, the number of logically masked iterations, m, to 0.
– For each iteration i from 0 to a certain number of iterations S:
* Generate a random sequence of C clock cycles, where the length
of each entry in the random sequence is the same as the number
of input in the circuit.
* Simulate the circuit to get the fault free original output by applying
the generated random sequence and store the output sequence in
O, where the length of each output in O is the same as the number
of outputs in the circuit.
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* Inject F number of faults in the circuit randomly in the cycle num-
ber dC
2
e. This way temporal faults are emulated.
* Simulate the circuit to get the faulty output sequence and store it
in vector OF .
* If the output sequence O differs from OF in any cycle, then the
current iteration i which involves injecting F faults failed and k is
incremented. Otherwise, it is successful.
* A successful iteration is either protected by redundant states, hence
p is incremented; or masked logically within the circuit, hence m
is incremented.
– Repeat for next i.
– Calculate the failure rate when F faults are injected, denoted by RF ,
by RF =
k
S
.
– Calculate the protection rate when F faults are injected, denoted by
RP , by RP =
p
S
.
– Calculate the masking rate when F faults are injected, denoted by RM ,
by RM =
m
S
.
– We can plot RF , RP and RM versus F as needed.
 Repeat for next F .
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5.3 Assumptions
There are few assumptions made in our reliability evaluator as follows:
 Since we are experimenting the effect of temporal soft faults, the number
of faults that are injected to the circuit should be few; actually they are
measured by FIT (failure in each 109 hours of operation). However, they
are injected up to N = 30 faults.
 The number of iterations, S, is 1000.
 The number of cycles, C, is 33. Hence the faults are injected in cycle number
17.
 The faults are injected randomly based on perl rand() method.
 Faults are injected randomly in the gate level of the circuit.
 Since the proposed techniques affect the protection of faults occurring in
FFs or thier logic, the faults are injected in the combinational logic part
that represent the D-type flip flop equations or the flip flop themselves.
In other words, the combinational logic part corresponding to the output
equation is excluded.
 Only logical masking is considered. The electrical masking as well as timing
masking are not considered by our evaluator.
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Figure 5.1: Injection traces.
5.4 Fault Model and Fault Injection Mechanism
In our work, we assume a stuck at fault model. When we inject faults at any
gate, it can be either stucked-at-1 (i.e. connected to Vdd) or stucked-at-0 (i.e.
connected to ground). In order to preserve the temporal property of the faults,
each simulation iteration is done for C number of cycles. The stuck-at faults are
injected in one cycle (i.e. the middle one).
By injecting faults in the middle cycle, FSM trace of states can be divided into
3 parts as shown in Figure 5.1. Pre-injection trace at which the FSM is initialized
to a certain state; injection trace, which is only 1 cycle at which the faults are
injected; and Post-injecting trace, at which the circuit is tested whether the fault
effect is propagated. According to [29], 10 cycles are enough to test if the faults
are affecting the behavior of the FSM or not. In our method, we assume that the
Post-injecting trace contains 16 cycles.
Fault injection happens in the gate level of the circuit randomly. In case of a
stuck-at-1 fault, the line at which the fault is injected is replaced by an OR-gate
with a fault indicator input Fi set to 1 at the injection cycle. When a stuck-at-0
fault is injected, the line at which the fault is injected is replaced by an AND-gate
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Figure 5.2: Fault injection mechanism.
with an inverted input. The fault indicator Fi is connected to the inverted input
and is set to 1 at the injection cycle. This is shown in Figure 5.2.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND
FINDINGS
In this chapter, we will discuss the results for some experiments that have been
performed. First, we will describe the experiment we choose to perform and the
justification for such choice. Then, a detailed discussion of the findings is given for
both Algorithm 1 described in Chapter 3 and Algorithm 2 described in Chapter 4.
6.1 Experiments
Several experiments have been performed for different ISCAS89 sequential cir-
cuits. The circuits bbara, bbsse, dk14, lion9, shiftreg, train11, cse, keyb, s1,
planet, pma, s832, s1494, sand, styr and tbk are the ones chosen for our experi-
ments.
For each circuit, several versions are implemented and experimented as follows:
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 Original circuit with sharing logic in the combinational logic blocks imple-
menting the next state equations of memory elements.
 Original circuit without sharing logic in the combinational logic blocks im-
plementing the next state equations of memory elements.
 Protecting a number of states that yields a minimum of 25% state probability
coverage without sharing the logic.
 Protecting a number of states that yields a minimum of 50% state probability
coverage without sharing the logic.
 Protecting a number of states that yields a minimum of 90% state probability
coverage without sharing the logic.
 Protecting all the states.
Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 show the steady state probability analysis for the
chosen circuits. For each circuit, 25%, 50% and 90% state probability coverage are
marked. In addition, the number of states protected in each case is shown. For
example, for the circuit bbara, 90% state probability coverage involves protecting
5 states out of 10. On the other hand, for the circuit cse, 90% state coverage
requires protecting only 2 states out of 16.
Two different reliability enhancement methods are done for each circuit as
follows:
 Hardening: it covers all the methods that involve protection of faults oc-
curring at the memory elements. In simulation, we assumed the best case
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Table 6.1: FSM benchmark steady state probability analysis: bbara, bbsse, dk14
and lion9.
Table 6.2: FSM benchmark steady state probability analysis: train11, cse, keyb
and s1.
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Table 6.3: FSM benchmark steady state probability analysis: planet, pma, s832
and s1494.
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Table 6.4: FSM benchmark steady state probability analysis: sand, styr and tbk.
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scenario which means when a fault hits a memory element, it is protected.
We assume that combinational logic implementing the next state equations
of memory elements are non shared.
 TMRing both combinational logic and memory elements: at which each
memory element (aka FF) is triplicated along with its combinational logic
as shown in Figure 6.1 and then a voter circuit is added. The combinational
logic is assumed to be non shared between memory elements.
Each of the experiments in each circuit follows the framework of Figure 6.2.
The FSM or state table - formatted in kiss format- either taken as is or after
adding redundant states are converted to blif using sis. At that stage the com-
binational logic of the state variables equations are shared one time to get the
original sequential circuit implementation, and not shared another time to see the
impact of logic separation on the reliability of the circuit. After that, blif file of
the sequential circuit is converted to bench format which is accepted by hope tool.
The bench files, either taken as original circuits or protected by our method, are
accepted as an argument by our evaluator described in Section 5.2. Ultimately,
failure rate versus the number of injected faults for each circuit is plotted using
Matlab.
6.2 Calculating the Area Overhead
Techniques involving adding redundancy to enhance reliability often pay the
price in terms of area. We calculate the size of sequential circuits relative to the
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Figure 6.1: TMRing both combinational logic and memory elements.
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Figure 6.2: Framework of experiments.
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Table 6.5: Size of gates.
size of a single inverter. Table 6.5 shows the library that we used to estimate the
size of circuits.
Particularly in the hardening case, we assume that the size of each latch is 2.5
times the size of an original latch. This assumption is concluded from the paper
in [38].
6.3 Algorithm 1 Results
In this section, we will apply Algorithm 1 to the circuits stated in Section 6.1.
The resulting findings are discussed particularity for dk14 and for the remaining
circuits in the next few sections.
6.3.1 Case Study: dk14 Benchmark
The sequential circuit dk14, which has 7 states, is picked to discuss general
results. State 3 is protected to achieve a minimum of 25% state probability cov-
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erage; states 3, 1 and 2 are protected to achieve a minimum of 50% coverage; and
states 3, 2, 1 and 5 are protected to achieve around 90% coverage. Figure 6.3
shows 25%, 50%, 90% and 100% state probability coverage failure rate versus the
number of injected faults. It is compared to the original circuit with and without
sharing the logic between state variables. Also, it is compared to hardening and
TMRing both the logic and the flip flops.
Results shown in Figure 6.3 show that as we cover more number of states
the failure rate drops down and hence the reliability is increased. This is clearly
shown by comparing the 25%, 50%, 90% and 100% state probability coverage
failure rates. It is particularly marked that 50% and 90% give a significant drop
in failure rate. In Section 3.4, the correlation between failure rate and state
probability is throughly discussed. According to results in Figure 6.3, consistent
observations are found. The failure rate decreases as more states with higher
probability of occurrence are protected. Also, it is noticeable that by separating
the logic to ensure that all single errors happening in the protected states are
tolerated gives a lower failure rate than the original circuit with sharing the logic.
This is expected since SET can cause multiple errors in different memory elements
in the original circuit with shared logic.
Hardening techniques and TMRing have failure rate curves which are better
than the original dk14 circuit and its non-shared version. However, non sharing
the logic has stronger impact in lowering the failure rate compared to the original
shared circuit. By comparing our method to hardening and TMRing methods,
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they give a very comparable measurement to protecting states that yield a min-
imum of 25% state probability coverage especially when the number of injected
faults increases beyond 15 faults.
To complete the picture, Figure 6.4 compares the area of the implementation of
the discussed curves. It is shown that the area of the implemented circuit increases
as the number of protected states, providing 25%, 50%, 90% up to 100% state
probability coverage, increases. This is a logical expected price paid to redeem
the pros of enhancing the reliability. However, at 100% state probability coverage
the area overhead is unacceptably large even though the failure rate drop is the
best. To avoid this excessive area overhead, protecting 50% or 90% can be chosen
at which a significant drop in terms of failure rate compared to original circuit is
obtained and the area overhead is significantly reduced.
Furthermore, one interesting observation is found for dk14 when protecting
states 3 and 1 is compared against protecting states 3 and 2. Since the probability
calculation for each pair of states, i.e. (state3, state1) and (state3, state2), are
nearly the same, it is expected that the resulting failure rate curves be very close
to each other. However, as it is shown in Figure 6.5, we observe that protecting
states 3 and 2 is better in terms of failure rate than protecting states 3 and 1.
By analyzing their failure rate, protection rate as well as masking rate (See
Figures 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7), we found that even though the protection rate of the pair
(state3,state1) is more than the protection rate of (state3,state2), the masking rate
of (state3,state2) is more than the masking rate of (state3,state1). This masking
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Figure 6.3: Failure rate vs Faults for dk14.
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Figure 6.4: Size of dk14 experiments.
130
Figure 6.5: Failure rate of protecting state3-state1 vs state3-state2.
is the dominate factor that overcome the protection impact using redundant states
against SET when state3 and state2 are protected. In other words, the masking
rate of the resulting circuit when state3 and state2 are protected causes the failure
rate to drop more than the one when state 3 and state 1 are protected.
6.3.2 Other Benchmarks Results
We can classify sequential circuits based on their states probability into three
classes. The first class contains states which are close to each other in terms
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Figure 6.6: Protection rate of protecting state3-state1 vs state3-state2.
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Figure 6.7: Masking rate of protecting state3-state1 vs state3-state2.
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of steady state probability. Hence, many number of states (sometimes up to
half of them) are protected to obtain a minimum of 25%, 50% and 90% state
probability coverage. The second class contains states which have significant
difference from each other in terms of steady state probability. Hence, few number
of states (sometimes 1 or 2 states) are protected to obtain a minimum of 25%, 50%
and 90% state probability coverage. The third class contains states which have
similar steady state probability. Hence, the percentage of the number of protected
states to obtain a certain state probability coverage is equal to the specified state
probability coverage. The resulting number of protected states in the third class
is more than the ones in the first class.
The sequential circuit dk14 which is discussed in the previous section is one
of the first class circuits. Other circuits such as bbara, bbsse, s1, pma and sand
behave like dk14 circuit. Their simulation results illustrating failure rate and area
comparison are given in Figures 6.8 to 6.17. The results show that as we cover
more number of states, the failure rate drops down and hence the reliability is
increased. This is clearly shown by comparing the 25%, 50%, 90% and 100%
state probability coverage failure rates compared to original circuit with shared
logic. The area overhead increased as the number of protected states increases
which is reflected by the increase in state probability coverage percentage. The
same scenario is observed when they are compared to the the non-shared version
of the original circuit except that the non-shared version gives lower failure rate
measurement than the shared version but a very comparable area measurement.
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By comparing with hardening technique, protecting states yielding a minimum of
25% state probability coverage gives better failure rate than hardening in cost of
slightly more area overhead. TMRing gives failure rate curve which is between
the failure rate curve of protecting states yielding a minimum of 25% state prob-
ability coverage and 50% state probability coverage. However, the area overhead
of TMRing is more than protecting state with 50% state probability coverage
with 0.5 up to 1 time additional area overhead. Our technique yielding 100%
state probability coverage gives the best failure rate reduction compared to all
other methods. However, the area overhead is excessively increased up to 9 times
compared to the original circuit. A recommended solution with much lower area
overhead and a comparable failure rate is protecting states that yield 90% state
probability coverage.
Other circuits such as cse, keyb, styr and s832 fall under the second class and
show different results than the first class. Their corresponding failure rate and
sizes are shown in Figures 6.18 to 6.25, respectively. They involve protecting a
very few number of states to get 50% and 90% state probability coverage. It is no-
table that by adding slightly more hardware to the original circuit in an intelligent
way, such as when protecting states yielding a minimum of 50% or 90% probabil-
ity coverage, we gain huge improvement in terms of failure rate. Comparing to
hardening and TMRing methods, protecting states yielding 90% state probability
coverage gives better results in terms of failure rate with area overhead very com-
parable to hardening and about 50% less than TMRing. This is mainly because
135
Figure 6.8: Failure rate vs Faults for bbara.
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Figure 6.9: Size of bbara experiments.
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Figure 6.10: Failure rate vs Faults for bbsse.
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Figure 6.11: Size of bbsse experiments.
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Figure 6.12: Failure rate vs Faults for s1.
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Figure 6.13: Size of s1 experiments.
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Figure 6.14: Failure rate vs Faults for pma.
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Figure 6.15: Size of pma experiments.
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Figure 6.16: Failure rate vs Faults for sand.
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Figure 6.17: Size of sand experiments.
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Figure 6.18: Failure rate vs Faults for cse.
hardening the memory elements alone doesn’t give enough protection and TM-
Ring fails if the faults happen in the voter circuit. As we mentioned in first class
circuits, our technique yielding 100% state probability coverage gives the best
failure rate reduction compared to all other methods. However, the area overhead
is high. Hence, 90% state probability coverage protection is recommended.
If the steady state probabilities of the states in the FSM of sequential circuit
are very far away from each other, our technique achieves significant improvement
in terms of failure rate and area overhead with a very comparable area overhead to
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Figure 6.19: Size of cse experiments.
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Figure 6.20: Failure rate vs Faults for keyb.
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Figure 6.21: Size of keyb experiments.
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Figure 6.22: Failure rate vs Faults for styr.
150
Figure 6.23: Size of styr experiments.
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Figure 6.24: Failure rate vs Faults for s842.
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Figure 6.25: Size of s832 experiments.
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the original circuit especially in cases such as covering 50% or even 90% of the state
probability. This is because only few number of states are protected. However,
if the steady state probabilities of the states are equal (i.e. third class) or very
close to each other (i.e. first class), although our method results in a significant
drop in terms of failure rate than the original circuit, it adds more area overhead
to the circuit that can be sometimes more than TMRing both the combinational
logic and the memory elements especially in 90% probability coverage case. To
see that we can compare second class circuits such as cse, keyb, styr and s832
(See Figures 6.18 to 6.25) with third class circuits such as lion9 and train11 (See
Figures 6.26 to 6.29). In train11 case, we observe that 90% state probability
coverage protection is better than protecting all the states in terms of failure rate.
The main reason for this behavior is that the masking in 90% state probability
coverage protection case is more than the masking when all states are protected.
Two of the big FSM benchmark circuits in terms of states are planet (belongs
to first class) and s1494 (belongs to second class). They both have 48 states in
their FSM. The circuit planet involves protecting many states because the states
probability are very close to each other. On the other hand, for the circuit s1494,
protecting 1 state out of 48 achieves about 90% state probability coverage. In
Figures 6.30 to 6.33, both circuits show better performance in terms of failure
rate especially with 90% state probability coverage. Moreover, both circuits are
better than hardening and TMRing methods. However, specifically in s1494 case,
the powerfulness of our method is shown. The failure rate is hugely improved and
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Figure 6.26: Failure rate vs Faults for lion9.
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Figure 6.27: Size of lion9 experiments.
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Figure 6.28: Failure rate vs Faults for train11.
157
Figure 6.29: Size of train11 experiments.
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Figure 6.30: Failure rate vs Faults for planet.
covers almost 90% of state probabilities by protecting only and only 1 state with
overall area cost that is 1.5 times compared to the original circuit.
The circuit tbk (See Figures 6.34 and 6.35 ) is a special circuit with the best
logical masking among the circuits. The original circuit without sharing the logic
among the memory elements gives around 0.025 failure rate when injecting 30
faults and 0.05 failure rate at injecting 60 faults. Because the logical masking of
the circuit is good enough in the original circuit, TMRing fails in enhancing the
reliability because they introduce voter circuits that present new hardly masked
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Figure 6.31: Size of planet experiments.
160
Figure 6.32: Failure rate vs Faults for s1494.
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Figure 6.33: Size of s1494 experiments.
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Figure 6.34: Failure rate vs Faults for tbk.
point of failure. The hardening methods gives a very close failure rate to the
original circuit without sharing the logic. On the other hand, 25%, 50%, 90% as
well as 100% all give better failure rate measurement.
6.3.3 Aggregated Results and Conclusions
In this section, we report the aggregated results from running FSM sequential
benchmark circuits such as: bbara, bbsse, dk14, lion9, train11, cse, keyb, s1,
planet, pma, s832, s1494, sand, styr and tbk. Results of failure rate from ISCAS89
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Figure 6.35: Size of tbk experiments.
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sequential benchmark circuits for injecting 1, 5, 10, 20 and 30 faults are shown in
Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10. In those tables, the amount of reduction (-ve
sign in the table) or increase from the original circuit in terms of failure rate is
stated and averaged among all the circuits. For each circuit, the failure rate of the
original circuit, the non-shared version of it, 25%, 50%, 90% and 100% probability
coverage failure rate, hardening, and TMRing both the logic and the flip flops are
reported.
From these tables, we can draw the following conclusions:
 By injecting 1 fault, the best failure rate reduction is 100% for 100% state
probability coverage protection using Algorithm 1. This is followed by 94%
failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 88% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 86% failure rate reduction for
TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 76% failure rate reduction
for 25% state probability coverage, 66% failure rate reduction for hardening,
then 60% failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
 By injecting 5 faults, the best failure rate reduction is 96% for 100% state
probability coverage protection using Algorithm 1. This is followed by 91%
failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 82% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 80% failure rate reduction for
TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 71% failure rate reduction
for 25% state probability coverage, 62% failure rate reduction for hardening,
then 53% failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
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 By injecting 10 faults, the best failure rate reduction is 93% for 100% state
probability coverage protection using Algorithm 1. This is followed by 86%
failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 76% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 70% failure rate reduction for
TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 64% failure rate reduction
for 25% state probability coverage, 55% failure rate reduction for hardening,
then 45% failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
 By injecting 20 faults, the best failure rate reduction is 87% for 100% state
probability coverage protection using algorithm 1. lThis is followed by 76%
failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 64% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 55% failure rate reduction for
TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 53% failure rate reduction
for 25% state probability coverage, 46% failure rate reduction for hardening,
then 36% failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
 By injecting 30 faults, the best failure rate reduction is 81% for 100% state
probability coverage protection using Algorithm 1. This is followed by 68%
failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 55% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 45% failure rate reduction for
25% state probability coverage, 43% failure rate reduction for TMRing both
the logic and memory elements, 38% failure rate reduction for hardening,
then 29% failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
The area for each experiment in each circuit is shown in Table 6.11. The most
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Table 6.6: Failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits - Inject-
ing 1 fault.
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Table 6.7: Failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits - Inject-
ing 5 fault.
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Table 6.8: Failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits - Inject-
ing 10 fault.
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Table 6.9: Failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits - Inject-
ing 20 fault.
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Table 6.10: Failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits - In-
jecting 30 fault.
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area overhead on average is 1185% for 100% state probability coverage protection
using Algorithm 1. This is followed by 315% for 90% state probability coverage,
219% for TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 143% for 50% state prob-
ability coverage, 83% for 25% state probability coverage, 24% for hardening, then
3% area overhead for non-shared logic original circuit.
It is concluded that protecting states yielding 90% state probability coverage
increase the area of the original circuit for about 4 times. Protecting states yield-
ing 50% state probability coverage almost increases the area of the original circuit
2.5 times. Protecting states yielding 25% state probability coverage almost in-
creases the area of the original circuit 1.8 time. On the other hand, TMRing both
combinational logic and memory elements increases the area of the original circuit
3 times which is between the area overhead cost of protecting states yielding 90%
state probability coverage and 50%.
In Table 6.12, the number of protected states in each state probability coverage
is summarized and averaged among the circuits. The following points can be
concluded:
 To cover 25% state probability of a FSM, 2 states on average should be
protected. This is 9% of states in the FSM.
 To cover 50% state probability of a FSM, 4 states on average should be
protected. This is 21% of states in the FSM.
 To cover 90% state probability of a FSM, 9 states on average should be
protected. This is 40% of states in the FSM.
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Table 6.11: Area overhead for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark circuits.
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Table 6.12: Number of protected states for ISCAS89 sequential benchmark cir-
cuits.
 To cover 100% state probability of a FSM, 23 states on average should be
protected. This is 100% of states in the FSM.
The overall averages derived from the previously mentioned tables are shown
in Table 6.13. We can say that on average, the best failure rate reduction is 91.4%
for 100% state probability coverage protection using Algorithm 1. This is followed
by 83% failure rate reduction for 90% state probability coverage, 73% failure rate
reduction for 50% state probability coverage, 66.8% failure rate reduction for
TMRing both the logic and memory elements, 61.8% failure rate reduction for
25% state probability coverage, 53.4% failure rate reduction for hardening, 44.6%
failure rate reduction for non-shared logic original circuit.
Based on the results in this section, we can draw the following conclusions:
 Protecting all the states guarantees 100% protection against single fault
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Table 6.13: Overall averaged failure rate results for ISCAS89 sequential bench-
mark circuits.
errors.
 The best failure rate reduction is 91.4% when 100% state probability pro-
tection is chosen. However, the area overhead is about 13 times the original
circuit and all the states must be protected by redundant states. We can
avoid this by protecting states yielding 90% (50% or 25%) state probability
coverage with area cost of about 4 times the original circuit( 2.5 time for
50% or just adding 1.8 the original area for 25%). The number of states that
should be protected in 90% probability state coverage is 40% of the states
in the FSM (21% for 50% state probability coverage or 9% for 25%).
 Even thought we assume the best case scenario in hardening, protecting
the memory elements alone does not give enough fault tolerance. Hardening
enhances failure rate by 53.4% with area overhead of 1.24 times compared to
the original sequential circuits with sharing combinational logic between the
memory elements. However, by not sharing the combinational logic between
the memory element without protecting them, the failure rate reduction
is 44.6% (10% difference from hardening) with only area overhead of 1.03
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compared to the shared original circuit.
 Protecting states yielding 90% state probability coverage is recommended
since it reduces the failure rate dramatically by 83% when compared to orig-
inal circuit which is better than TMRing both logic and memory elements.
However, the area overhead when protecting states that yield to 90% state
probability coverage is 4 times the original circuit size while TMRing area
overhead is 3 times.
 If less area overhead is a requirement in the design of sequential circuit,
protecting states yielding 50% state probability is recommended since it
reduces the failure rate by 73% while the area overhead is below 2.5 times
the original circuit.
6.4 Algorithm 2 Results
In this section, we will apply Algorithm 2 to two of the sequential benchmark
circuits. The resulting findings for the circuits dk14 and bbara are discussed in
the following section.
6.4.1 Comparison Between Different State Encodings
For each of the circuits (i.e. dk14 and bbara), four different random state
encodings are considered and are compared to the encoding resulting from apply-
ing nova for state assignment in terms of failure rate and area. The objective is
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Table 6.14: Codes used in Algorithm 2 for dk14.
to show the impact of starting with an already area optimized sequential circuit
using nova state assignment on the resulting area after adding fault tolerance.
For each state encoding, protecting states which yield to 90% state probability
coverage is chosen.
For circuit dk14, the failure rate for the different types of encodings (see Ta-
ble 6.14) are shown in Figure 6.36. Their failure rate despite their encodings are
very close to each other. However, it is clearly depicted in Figure 6.37 that nova
got the lowest area among the different encodings after applying protection us-
ing Algorithm 2 because it is originally the best area optimization that gives the
minimum possible area overhead in the original circuit.
Likewise, bbara states are given different encodings (see Table 6.15) and their
corresponding failure rates are shown in Figure 6.36. Again the area of nova is
the minimum as it is shown in Figure 6.38.
We conclude that regardless of the encoding of states, the failure rate of pro-
tecting the same states is similar for different state encodings. By starting from
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Figure 6.36: Failure rate vs Faults for dk14.
Table 6.15: Codes used in Algorithm 2 for bbara.
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Figure 6.37: Size of dk14 experiments.
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Figure 6.38: Failure rate vs Faults for bbara.
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Figure 6.39: Size of bbara experiments.
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an area optimized sequential circuit using nova to add another layer of protection
using state redundancy, the resulting area overhead remains minimal.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
Recently, systems became more subjected to higher manufacturing defects
and higher susceptibility to soft errors due to the exponential decrease in device
feature size. Currently, soft errors induced by ion particles are no longer limited
to specific field such as aerospace applications. This raises the challenge to come
up with techniques to tackle transient or soft error effects in both combinational
and sequential circuits in general. In this work, we have analyzed, modeled and
designed sequential circuits at the design level, namely finite state machine (FSM),
to increase its susceptibility to radiation induced transient faults or temporal soft
errors.
We have introduced a novel idea, presented as Algorithm 1, to increase se-
quential circuit reliability and hence fault tolerance by introducing redundant
equivalent states to the states with high probability of occurrence in sequential
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circuit behavioral machine. To maintain the same operation of the unprotected
FSM, the newly added redundant states have the same input, next state, and
output as the original states. Other states with low probability are kept without
adding redundancy. This way the area overhead is kept minimal. The analysis of
the problem suggests that the hamming distance between protected states codes
should be at least 3 to guarantee no overlapping between the redundant states
codes. According to our knowledge, none has presented the introduction of re-
dundant states for states with high probability of occurrence at the FSM level.
This idea introduces a new class of methods that tackle the soft error effect in
early stages, namely at the design stage.
The experimental results show that the best failure rate reduction is found to
be 91% on average when 100% state probability coverage protection is chosen for
up to 30 injected faults. However, the area overhead is about 13 times the original
circuit and all the states must be protected by redundant states. We avoid this by
protecting states yielding 90% (50% or 25%) state probability coverage with area
overhead about 4 times the original size (2.5 time for 50% or by adding 1.8 times
the original area for 25%). The number of states that should be protected in 90%
state probability coverage is 40% of the states in the FSM on average (21% for
50% state probability coverage or 9% for 25%).
Next, state assignment has been explored and found to have a minimal impact
on soft error tolerance of sequential circuits. Hence, another technique has been
proposed to enhance reliability to a sequential circuit that has a specific state
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assignment optimizing a certain criteria such as area. The technique, presented
as Algorithm 2 starts from a state assignment or state encoding that optimizes
a certain criteria such as area or power, and adds fault tolerance on top of it
so that the optimization is kept. An optimized sequential circuit for area using
nova can be enhanced by adding a layer of protection using state redundancy
by adding extra bits to the left of chosen protected states encodings that have
high probability of occurrence. As the original encoding of the protected states
optimizes area on one hand, the extra added bits, which guarantee a hamming
distance of 3 between the protected states, result in fault tolerance property on
the other hand.
Since we started from a minimum point of area overhead which results from
the original state encoding, the resulting area overhead in the protected circuit
remains minimal. This is explained by the fact that cubes from the original
FSM are actually either kept the same, result in a reduced form of them (more
literals are added), split into two or more cubes, or/and additional cubes are
added to cover the redundant states. We conclude that regardless of the encoding
of states, the failure rate of protecting the same states is similar for different state
encoding. Choosing state assignment using nova which targets area optimization
as a starting point, we can add another layer of protection using state redundancy
and the resulting area overhead remains minimal.
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7.1 Summary of the Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
 Implementation of a tool for computing state probabilities for a finite state
machine.
 Implementation of a tool for computing soft error reliability for sequential
circuits based on Monte Carlo simulation [13]. The objective of this tool is
to find the failure rate of a sequential circuit as more faults are observed in
the circuit. The monte carlo based simulation tool has been developed using
Perl [14–16] in Linux [17–20] system to assess the soft error reliability of the
resulting synthesized circuits. (SIS) tool [21] has been used for synthesis
and (hope) tool [22] has been used for simulation purposes.
 Development and implementation of an algorithm, Algorithm 1, to enhance
reliability of sequential circuits based on adding redundant states at the
state diagram level to ensure single fault tolerance. The development of
the algorithm has been done by modifying the finite state machine of a
sequential circuit by adding the minimum necessary equivalent redundant
states to selected states for which soft error tolerance is desired. Also, the
minimum number of bits used in state encoding that ensure fault tolerance
of single faults has been computed. It was done using C# [23].
 Evaluation of the proposed soft error tolerant design algorithm in terms of
circuit reliability and other parameters including area and comparison with
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existing techniques. A tool has been developed for assigning codes to states
according to certain developed heuristics. (SIS) tool has been used in the
synthesis process and the developed monte carol based simulation tool has
been used to assess soft error tolerance of synthesized circuits.
 Investigating the impact of state assignment on sequential circuits reliability
which lead to the implementation of Algorithm 2 that increases reliability
of an optimized sequential circuit.
 Development and implementation an algorithm, Algorithm 2, for state as-
signment to enhance soft error tolerance on top of an area optimized design.
 Evaluation of the proposed state assignment for soft error tolerance in terms
of soft error reliability and area.
7.2 Future Work
This work led to many ideas and many possible future work. They are:
 Extending the idea of adding redundancy using probability calculation, that
enhances fault tolerance, to combinational circuits. This can be achieved by
taking advantage of knowing the likelihood of an intermediate line in a digital
circuit to has a value of 1 or 0. For example, the output of an AND-gate is
3/4 of the time 0; so it is better to protect the 0 of that line more than the
1.
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 Developing an algorithm that enhances reliability for a power optimized
sequential circuit. By starting from a state assignment that gives lower
power consumption to sequential circuits and applying it to Algorithm 2 as
input, it is expected that the power consumption will also be kept minimal.
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